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By 1967, a trinity of major regional institutions could be found in Southeast Asia—the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  SEATO was a military organization founded 
by the US and interested allies, ASEAN a purely Southeast Asian initiative and the ADB was 
somewhere in between, being a US-supported institution but run by Asians.  Because of the 
scale of US developmental assistance to Southeast Asia and diplomatic energy in inducing 
regionalism, no study of American and Southeast Asian international relations is satisfactory 
without due consideration of the regional institutions spearheaded by both sides.  As much 
as the US- and Southeast Asia-initiated regional bodies occurred quite separately from each 
other, bilateral ties influenced the process.  Therefore, bilateralism and multilateralism were 
closely interrelated and could help or hinder each other.  More importantly, these regional 
mechanisms were the result of the intellectual currents of the day and thus stemmed from 
the same premise—that peace in Southeast Asia was best achieved by development and 
multilateral cooperation.  Hence, I argue that the creation of regional developmental 
institutions in 1967, the ADB and ASEAN, was the result of both long term US policymaking 
from 1945 as well as American and Southeast Asian responses to the immediate regional 
problems and instability. 
 
When considering American involvement in Southeast Asia, the focus is almost 
always on the military aspect on the mainland in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and SEATO, 
suggesting a policy vacuum towards the peninsula area.  My research shows that US efforts 
in creating stability in the region were not limited to military means.  In fact, Washington 
also viewed Southeast Asia through the prism of multilateralism and modernization.  They 
vi 
 
channeled much energy and funding into foreign assistance and fostering regional 
cooperation from 1945 such that by 1967, various developmental regional apparatus were 
established in the rimland area alongside SEATO and the US military commitment in 
Vietnam.  It is also through the distinction in US military and economic regional involvement 
that one can discern the differential treatment of mainland and island Southeast Asia in 
American foreign policy.  Eventually, region-wide military involvement, à la NATO, was 
dropped in favour of social, cultural and economic bilateral partnerships; ASEAN and the 
ADB.  US interest in Southeast Asia continued to be expressed in long-term socio-economic 
assistance to the region.  On the part of Southeast Asians, the Southeast Asia Friendship and 
Economic Treaty (SEAFET), ASA, Maphilindo and ASEAN not only reflect the progressive 
evolution of regional institutions and experimentation with regional modes of politics by 
Southeast Asian leaders, but also reveal the changing attitudes and perceptions of these 
leaders towards each other and the other regional players.  The chapters chronologically 
pursue the development of regionalism in Southeast Asian in order to demonstrate the long-







By 1967, a trinity of major regional institutions could be found in Southeast Asia—the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  SEATO was a military organization founded 
by the US and interested allies, ASEAN a purely Southeast Asian initiative and the ADB was 
somewhere in between, being a US-supported institution but run by Asians.  Ten years later, 
SEATO was disbanded but the ADB and ASEAN remain to this day and stand partly as 
testimony to US efforts to influence and retain a role in Southeast Asian affairs. 
 
The US has been involved in Southeast Asia since the end of the Second World War.  
The American interest in regional stability, security and global postwar economic recovery 
resulted in the creation of SEATO in 1954 (an Asian counterpart of NATO for containing 
Chinese Communist expansion) with the US as a principal member.  Throughout the 1960s, 
Washington quietly watched and supported other regional initiatives in island Southeast 
Asia such as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and the Malaysia-Indonesia-Philippines 
(Maphilindo) grouping, in hopes of providing further regional stability by means of inter-
state cooperation. 
 
Southeast Asia can be divided into sub-regions, the mainland and island area.  
Nicholas Tarling demarcates island Southeast Asia as the region which geographically 
encompasses the modern nation-states of Brunei, East Timor, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
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Philippines and Singapore.  The mainland sub-region comprises the modern nation states of 
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.1  According to Milton Osborne, mainland and island 
Southeast Asia can be differentiated by the linguistic differences of the societies in those 
sub-regions.2
 
  This thesis uses Tarling's distinction of mainland and island Southeast Asia. 
When considering American involvement in Southeast Asia, the focus is almost 
always on the military aspect on the mainland sub-region, SEATO or bilateral relations with 
independent Southeast Asian nation-states such as Indonesia, the Philippines, South 
Vietnam and Thailand.   This suggests a policy vacuum towards the island sub-region of 
Southeast Asia.  My research shows that US efforts in creating stability in the region were 
not limited to military means.  In fact, Washington also viewed Southeast Asia through the 
prism of multilateralism and modernization.  They channeled much energy and funding into 
foreign assistance and fostering regional cooperation from 1945 such that by 1967, various 
developmental regional apparatuses were established in the island area alongside SEATO 
and the US military commitment in Vietnam.  It is also through the distinction in US military 
and economic regional involvement that one can discern the differential treatment of 
mainland and island Southeast Asia in American foreign policy.  It bears notice that because 
Thailand was contiguous with both the mainland and island Southeast Asian nation-states, it 
was actively involved in US policy towards and developments in both sub-regions.  
Washington's two-pronged approach was a circumstantial development and, eventually, 
region-wide military involvement, à la NATO, was dropped in favour of social, cultural and 
economic partnerships through bilateral means—ASEAN and the ADB.  US interest in 
                                                            
1 Nicholas Tarling, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume 1, Part 1 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.304. 
2 Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (London: Allen and Unwin, 2010), pp.7-9. 
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Southeast Asia continues to be expressed in long-term socio-economic assistance to the 
region. 
 
No study of American and Southeast Asian international relations is satisfactory 
without due consideration of the regional institutions spearheaded by both sides.  As much 
as the US- and Southeast Asia-initiated regional bodies occurred quite separately from each 
other, bilateral ties influenced the process.  Therefore, bilateralism and multilateralism were 
closely interrelated and could help or hinder each other.  More importantly, these regional 
mechanisms reflected the intellectual currents of the day and thus stemmed from the same 
premise—that stability in Southeast Asia was best achieved by development and multilateral 
cooperation.  I argue that the creation of regional developmental institutions in 1967, the 
ADB and ASEAN, was the result of both long-term US policymaking from 1945 as well as 
American and Southeast Asian responses to instability and immediate regional problems.  I 
will study successive Southeast Asian regional organizations on both sides.  On the part of 
the US, the creation of SEATO and the ADB demonstrate American foreign policy philosophy, 
concerns and responses to situations in Southeast Asia.  On the part of Southeast Asians, the 
South-East Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET), ASA, Maphilindo and ASEAN not 
only reflect the progressive evolution of regional institutions and experimentation with 
regional modes of politics by Southeast Asian leaders, but also reveal the changing attitudes 






The first group of materials used in this thesis is US documents, many of which can be found 
online and in databases such as the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 
Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS) and the Digital National Security Archive 
(DNSA).  These sources were supplemented by others procured at the National Archives and 
Records Administration in the US.  My documentary research revealed that Washington had 
more extensive plans and discussions on regionalism in Southeast Asia than has been 
studied.  Additionally, a major influence on foreign policymaking was the developmental 
mindset, which was prevalent in government and academic circles. 
 
 The second group of primary sources used is transcripts of interviews, biographies 
and memoirs of key people involved in promoting regional cooperation on the US and 
Southeast Asian side.  From these materials, the contexts and motivations of the individual 
actors can be discerned.  An important example is Eugene R. Black's monograph on the US 
role in Southeast Asia, Alternative in Southeast Asia.3
 
 
 Newspapers are also a valuable resource for this thesis.  For the US side, the New 
York Times was used to piece together the chronology of the founding of the ADB and 
provide the background for the analysis of US government documents.  On the Southeast 
Asian side, the constraints on the scope of research for the thesis and source availability 
limits the newspapers perused to mainly regional publications.  Such newspapers were used 
to reconstruct the sequence of events for the initiation of indigenous regional organizations.  
                                                            
3 Eugene R. Black, Alternative in Southeast Asia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969). 
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They also demonstrate the importance of regional cooperation to Southeast Asian leaders 
because multilateralism was one of the ways in which the Third World sought to gain 
prestige as international players.  Such contemporary accounts offer valuable perspectives 
concerning the mindset and desires of Southeast Asian leaders.  Unlike the US, Southeast 
Asian states have yet to establish a tradition of declassifying government documents, 
making them unavailable for study.  The dearth of primary material is supplemented as 
much as possible with other secondary accounts on Southeast Asian history. 
 
Secondary Sources 
Much of the conceptualization of this thesis lay in my survey of the secondary literature on 
US involvement in Southeast Asia.  It illuminated the backdrop of my research and revealed 
the gap in the scholarship.  My study has brought me to three groups of works: histories of 
American engagement in Southeast Asia; interpretations of American diplomacy; and studies 
on Southeast Asian regionalism. 
 
1. Histories of American Engagement in Southeast Asia 
The works on the history of American involvement in Southeast Asia are voluminous, but 
because of the great impact of events in Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia on US 
policy, much of the scholarship is skewed towards US actions in these countries.  This is 
hardly surprising as these nation-states had great impact on American policy.  As a result, 
scholarship on US relations with the other Southeast Asian nation-states has been 
“disappointingly slim.”4
                                                            
4 Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.261. 
  Most of the literature also focuses on US military intervention in the 
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region.  The best work thus far that attempts to give equal attention to American 
engagement in Southeast Asia is Robert J. McMahon’s The Limits of Empire: The United 
States and Southeast Asia since World War II.5
 
  This general survey covers American motives 
and interests in Southeast Asia from the colonial to the postwar period.  It discusses 
American choices of action, which were influenced by their own ideas, and their impact and 
effectiveness in Southeast Asia.  McMahon also deals with US relations and interests in 
Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and South Vietnam and 
discusses their motivations for cooperating with or resisting American stances and policies.  
More importantly, McMahon emphasizes the role of ideology in addition to geopolitical and 
strategic concerns in the formulation of US policy in Southeast Asia.  Fundamentally, he tries 
to move away from being too focused on Vietnam while recognizing that American 
involvement in Southeast Asia was heavily skewed by developments there. 
Secondly, the secondary literature pays scant attention to how the US interacted 
with Southeast Asian regional organizations. The dominant focus of American foreign 
relations in the scholarship is on US bilateral relations. Chintamani Mahapatra’s American 
Role in the Origin & Growth of ASEAN, is a rare exception.6
                                                            
5 Ibid. 
  This book discusses American 
involvement in the formation of regional organizations in Southeast Asia, culminating in 
ASEAN.  The author argues that after 1947, the US involvement was limited to “support” and 
“discreet guidance” in order to contain communist expansion, deny Southeast Asia’s 
resources to communist bloc and gain them for the postwar Japanese and Western 
European recovery.  Although insightful, this piece sidelines Southeast Asian agency in 
developing regionalism.  It also suffers from inadequate documentation as it relies on 




contemporary published sources.  The relevant archival material has since been declassified, 
providing new opportunities to study the topic.  Scholars such as Damien Fenton utilized 
these sources in To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-
1965.7
 
  Contrary to the popular perception that SEATO was a failed security organization, 
Fenton offers a nuanced argument that SEATO was effective in its first ten years of 
existence.  He notes in particular, the SEATO member states themselves were never 
threatened by Communist insurgency, possibly lending weight to the argument that SEATO 
was successful in its deterrent purpose.  However, Fenton deals mainly with the formation, 
function and problems of SEATO.  Thus, he does not directly address broader American 
considerations in policymaking towards Southeast Asia.  Hence, these works suggest 
opportunities to study the place of regional cooperation in American and Southeast Asian 
foreign policies. 
2. Interpretations of American diplomacy 
The impact of the social-cultural turn on history has resulted in innovative approaches that 
stimulate much thought on the nature of American foreign relations.  Conceptual space to 
guide understandings of US international engagement has been opened up by studying new 
themes such as modernization, race, gender, religion etc.  Scholars such as Michael Adas and 
Michael Latham have focused on the way technology and ideas of modernity have 
influenced America foreign policy in the twentieth century.8
                                                            
7 Damien Fenton, To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2012). 
  In Mandarins of the Future: 
8 See, for example, Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's 
Civilizing Mission (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2006); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as 
Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
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Modernization Theory in Cold War America,9 Nils Gilman argues that fundamentally, 
modernization theory misinformed and misguided American foreign policy towards the 
postcolonial world.  Using three case studies, he demonstrates how modernization theory 
emerged out of the “constellation of ideas” of social science scholars in Cold War America.  
This was borne out of the search by US intellectuals and policymakers for ways to handle the 
various problems that emerged from decolonization, and in fact, the intellectual roots of this 
theory can be traced back to the debates on what constituted “modernity”.10
 
 
 However, these new works on US foreign relations tend to centre on the efforts of 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to effect modernization and development in the 
Third World.  In Southeast Asia, the focus is again on Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia.  
Essentially, the bodies of literature imply that US administrations prior to the 1960s did not 
have a policy towards island Southeast Asia and multilateralism.  My research reveals that 
modernization, development and multilateralism are, indeed, closely intertwined 
perspectives in US-Southeast Asia relations.  American assistance programs and attempts to 
foster regional cooperation did not always consider Southeast Asian political, socio-cultural 
and economic needs.  Washington's assumptions of the best way to aid societal 
development in the region and the increasing funding constraints they faced were a 
constant source of frustration for Southeast Asian leaders, who wanted US help in specific 
aspects and means.  This gap in expectations on both sides and the usage of modernization, 
development and multilateralism in US-Southeast Asia relations are themes addressed in my 
thesis. 
 
                                                            
9 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
10 Ibid., pp.1-3. 
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3. Studies on Southeast Asian regionalism 
The final group of secondary material that I will draw on for my thesis is scholarship on 
Southeast Asian regionalism.  Southeast Asian regionalism has been given very little 
attention in Southeast Asian history.  This is because regional studies have largely been 
state-centric and focus primarily on developments within the states and inter-state 
relations.  John Legge describes this as “the almost universal tendency of historians to focus 
on the constituent parts of Southeast Asia rather than to develop a perception of the region 
as a whole as a suitable subject of study.”11
 
  Thus, academically, the regional body politic has 
been marginalized.  Existing literature on the subject falls into three categories: works 
produced by the regional organizations; analyses of the functions and efficacy of these 
organizations; and historical accounts of Southeast Asian regionalism. 
 Pieces produced by the regional organizations can be classified as institutional works 
and focus on the organizations' engagement with contemporary issues and events with a 
self-congratulatory tone.  Some of these accounts deal with specific issues or events, or 
attempt some kind of historical overview of the organizations' development and regional 
role. They usually intersect with the second category of literature—analyses of the regional 
organizations. This group of material tends to be political science and international relations 
studies that focus primarily on ASEAN, contemporary issues, alliance models and the 
successes and failures of specific organizational aspects.  They also tend to be prescriptive 
and are overly focused on regional integration.  Thus, the studies consistently peg the 
development of Southeast Asian regional organizations to how closely they conform to the 
European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Therefore, indigenous 
                                                            
11 Quoted in Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p.1. 
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modes of political intercourse are subordinated to the European and American models.  
Some scholars who produce such accounts are Amitav Acharya, Ralf Emmers, See Seng Tan, 
the late Michael Leifer etc.12
 
   
The most relevant work that straddles these two bodies of literature is The 2nd 
ASEAN Reader, compiled by Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar.13  It is an encyclopedic 
collection of abridged articles on the formation, organizational structure, interests and 
topics on and related to ASEAN primarily for the period 1990 to 2003.  The compilers also 
attempted to broaden perspectives on ASEAN by incorporating excerpts of analytical 
literature by scholars from different disciplines, such as international relations, economics, 
strategic and security studies, sociocultural and religious studies and history.14
 
  
Unfortunately, the volume offers little on the historical development of ASEAN.  Accordingly, 
the perspective of historical continuity is omitted in analyses of contemporary regional 
affairs. 
 The third type of literature, historical accounts of Southeast Asian regionalism, is the 
most relevant to this thesis.  They cover changes and continuities in the formation and 
dissolution of regional blocs and the evolution of ideas of what constitutes a region and 
regional cooperation.  Regional organizations are situated and analyzed in the wider regional 
and global context. The commonly scrutinized institutions are SEATO, the Bandung 
                                                            
12 For example, Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National 
Interests and Regional Order (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004); Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security 
Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (New York: Routledge, 2009); 
Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan, The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy (Singapore: S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009); Michael Leifer, 
ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 1989). 
13 Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar, The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2003). 
14 Ibid., p.xiii. 
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Conference and ASEAN.  But existing scholarship is only the tip of the iceberg as the scope 
for the historical inquiry of regionalism in Southeast Asia is vast.  Some issues present 
themselves in current works. 
 
Firstly, as with Fenton’s book, they deal very much with the functions and 
organizational structures of the regional grouping.  Secondly, the role of the British in the 
formation of regional structures dominates in the literature.  Nicholas Tarling writes 
extensively on the British role in the origins of Southeast Asian regionalism.  His Regionalism 
in Southeast Asia: To Foster the Political Will, is a detailed historical treatment of the 
subject.15
 
  Tarling examines the influence of regional and extra-regional perceptions of 
Southeast Asia from the nineteenth century onwards, and how these in turn impact the 
creation of a Southeast Asian identity.  This is by far the most comprehensive work that 
connects all the regional projects and organizations attempted in Southeast Asia 
chronologically, thereby demonstrating possibly overlooked historical and ideological links.  
But it focuses overly on the British efforts to create stable institutions and structures in 
order to facilitate their withdrawal from the region in the postwar period.  The book 
presents only a part of the whole story and does not adequately consider the role of 
increasing American assistance to and presence in the region and the Southeast Asian 
assertion of sovereign will in regional affairs. 
Chapter Division 
Evidently, there is an opening in the secondary literature that raises the question of the role 
of the US in the development of Southeast Asian regionalism.  The availability of primary 
                                                            




sources also makes a historical examination of this aspect of US and Southeast Asia bilateral 
and multilateral interactions feasible.  This thesis is such a study. 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the US decision to use regional cooperation in Southeast Asia as 
a means to counter Communist expansion.  The chapter deals briefly with the 
conceptualization of regionalism, illuminates the US and Southeast Asian context from 1945-
54 and introduces the place of economic- and military-based regional cooperation in post-
Second World War US foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in the same period. 
 
Chapter 2 looks at the attempted transition of US foreign policy towards Southeast 
Asia from a bilateral to a more multilateral and developmental mode from 1955-58.  This 
was a response to the evolution of the Soviet threat, necessitating a review of US-Southeast 
Asia relations.  I also discuss the various problems that emerged on the American and 
Southeast Asian side in establishing a new multilateral framework for regional development.  
These issues resulted in a stalemate in the development of regionalism. 
 
Chapter 3 covers Southeast Asian efforts to foster regional cooperation from 1959-
65.  I explore the motivations of the Southeast Asian states and the relationship between 
their regional experiments with existing institutions such as SEATO and the Bandung 
Conference.  With these initiatives, agency for regionalism passed to Southeast Asians.  




Finally, the parallel establishment of the ADB and ASEAN from 1965-67 is studied in 
Chapter 4.  Both institutions represent the convergences and divergences in the foreign 
policy interests of the US and of the Southeast Asian nation-states.  The ADB and ASEAN 
were also the fulfillment of the American and Southeast Asian regional visions.  The ADB 
covered Asia and thus not targeted at Southeast Asia.  But, it was structured in such a way as 
to favour Southeast Asian developmental projects.  Essentially, the creation of these 
regional organizations rested on the premise that stability could only be achieved by 
multilateral developmental cooperation.  On hindsight, this was the unifying force in 




American Foreign Policy and Post-Second World War 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia, 1945-54 
 
Introduction 
This chapter covers the first decade of the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia.  
The exigencies of the post-war economic recovery of Asia and the perceived danger of 
Communist expansion necessitated a response by the US in order stabilize the region, 
safeguard American interests and limit foreign expenditure.   The strategy selected by US 
officials was fostering economic regionalism in Southeast Asia.  However, with the Dien Bien 
Phu debacle, Washington altered its initial course, resulting in the creation of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).  Consequently, US foreign policy in Southeast Asia 
proceeded on two tracks, economic and military. 
 
Conceptual Brief on Regionalism 
Before proceeding into the historical material, a brief explanation on the theoretical 
approaches to regionalism is required.  Historians find these conceptualizations useful in 
understanding its emergence in Southeast Asia.  In Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster 
the Political Will, Nicholas Tarling has provided a useful summary of how political science 
and international relations scholars and analysts have thought of regionalism.  These 
approaches are similar to theories of nationalism and can be employed chronologically to 
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explain the emergence of a region.  They are “primordialism,” “functionalism” and 
“constructivism.”  “Primordialism” argues that the region has always existed.  Therefore, 
regionalism is a historical force that drives the formation of regions.  It provides the 
foundational regional consciousness from which action towards regionalism derives.  The 
next two perspectives deal with efforts to create regional groupings.  “Functionalism” posits 
that regions are formed to serve common interests of the parties involved.   Lastly, 
“constructivism” is related to an imagined community and views regionalism as a social 
construction in international relations.16
 
  It is therefore possible to use Benedict Anderson’s 
ideas to conceive of a region. 
Amitav Acharya writes that “the earlier ‘scientific’ or positivist approaches that 
‘measured’ regionness using concrete empirical indicators…have given way to efforts that 
view regions primarily as ‘imagined’ constructs,” seeing regions much like nation-states.17  
However, this imagination does not necessarily come from the region itself.  Outside 
imaginings can and do precede indigenous ones.  This is true for Southeast Asia.  The region 
initially did not think of itself as “Southeast Asia” with the current ten states.  In fact, 
"Southeast Asia" was constructed by British military planners deliberating how to deal with 
the Japanese-occupied areas in Asia.  Hence, it is usual to perceive modern Southeast Asian 
regionalism as the product of Western endeavours.  This skews understandings of regional 
interactions.  Acharya notes further that in the scholarship on regionalism, there has also 
been “a shift from external, imperial and orientalist constructions of Southeast Asia to 
internal, indigenous and regional constructions.” 18
                                                            
16 Nicholas Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster the Political Will (New York: Routledge, 
2006), p.5. 
  Indeed, it is important to see polities in 
17 Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Oxford: Oxford 




Southeast Asia as participants in and purveyors of the formation of regionness.  Continuities 
should be drawn from historical Southeast Asian inter-state and sub-regional dynamics as 
they contribute to better and balanced understandings of modern regional arrangements. 
 
A further problem in perspective that emerges is the assumed nature of Southeast 
Asian polities.  That post-war Southeast Asia is composed of nation-states commonly results 
in the tendency to presuppose that they behave similarly to European ones.  However, 
nation-states in Southeast Asia are relatively younger as most of them emerged only after 
the Second World War.  Thus, they are at a different stage of historical development.  
Because many Southeast Asian states in the post-war period were typical “weak states” 
which encountered numerous internal divisions and the challenges of nation-building, their 
governments were “forc[ed]...to be inward-looking in their political and security outlook, 
and...even isolationist.”  The threats posed by “transborder movements of communist and 
separatist insurgents also undermined the basis of regional unity.”19
                                                            
19 Ibid., p.55. 
  Foreign affairs, much 
less an interest in multilateralism, were unsurprisingly not the main concern for these states.  
The priority was politico-socio development and the building of state apparatuses.  
Scholarship on Southeast Asian countries evidence this emphasis as little work has been 
focused on their foreign affairs compared to that on state-building.  Even if Southeast Asians 
were involved in regionalism, they were motivated by national interests.  For example, the 
concern of some newly decolonized nation-states in the 1950s and 1960s to preserve their 
sovereignty at all costs in the midst of the Cold War bloc politics was demonstrated by their 
participation in the Bandung Conference and in subsequent years, by projecting and 
maintaining a facade of non-alignment.  Ironically, this same concern would divide Bandung 
as individual states in the Afro-Asian world, to some degree, departed from non-alignment 
17 
 
and implemented ideological and policy positions that seemed best for their own societal 
development.  Thus, in any study on Southeast Asian regionalism, one must take into 
account the historical context and resultant problems faced by the nation-states in the 
region. 
 
The next section of this chapter will provide the historical backdrop for 
understanding US policy towards Southeast Asia.  I argue that in the post-Second World War 
period, regional cooperation was a means to manage decolonization in Southeast Asia to 
prevent its fall into the Communist orbit.  Since this policy was not unchanging, I will 
highlight the shifts in US approach over the years and then discuss the US role in the 
formation of the SEATO and the problems this institution faced in the 1950s.  This will reveal 
the complexities confronting American leaders when charting a workable course in the 
troubled period from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1950s and shed light on the principles 
of US policy towards Southeast Asia. 
 
Overview of the American Entry into Southeast Asia 
In the scholarship on post-Second World War history of Southeast Asia, one will encounter 
the transformation thesis.  Scholars supporting this idea argue that the Southeast Asian 
experience of the Second World War and the resultant Japanese Occupation had a 
revolutionary impact on the people living in the region.  It was a "watershed in the history of 
colonialism."20
                                                            
20 Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong, "Introduction," in Marc Frey, Ronald W. 
Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong, editors, The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives 
on Decolonization (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), p.ix. 
  The seeming ease with which the Japanese defeated the European colonial 
empires of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, discredited them in the eyes of their 
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colonial subjects.  Furthermore, the trauma of the Occupation years politicized those living 
in the colonies and gave rise to new anti-colonial nationalist elites and movements that 
called for decolonization.  The colonial powers had to respond to these expectations.  The 
British reluctantly accommodated the nationalists in their colonies and relatively smoothly 
decolonized Burma, Malaya and Singapore.  The British Empire became the Commonwealth.  
The Dutch and the French, whose homelands were occupied by Nazi Germany, were eager 
to retain their colonies as balm for their wounded pride and to use colonial resources in 
order to recover from the devastation caused by the war.  Thus, they adamantly resisted any 
change in the colonial relationship, resulting in bloody wars of decolonization fought in their 
respective colonies, Indonesia and Vietnam. 
 
The Americans were also ejected from their colony, the Philippines, during the 
Second World War, but returned triumphantly.  The interrupted pre-war decolonization plan 
resumed and the US granted the Philippines independence on 4 July 1946.  However, 
Washington could not coerce the European powers to do likewise for fear of an "irreparable 
breach" in consensus with France, Great Britain and the Netherlands over post-Second world 
War European problems.21  Thus, US policymakers adopted a compromise policy of 
"nonintervention and neutrality" towards the colonial conflicts in Southeast Asia, but 
favoured the gradual granting of self-government and, eventually, independence.  This 
position held until about 1947 when the Americans changed course.  Essentially, "war in 
Southeast Asia undermined Western Europe's political stabilization and economic recovery, 
two of America's commanding postwar priorities."22
                                                            
21 Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.26. 
  Thus, with the decolonization conflicts 
in Southeast Asia showing no sign of abating, and worse, draining resources that could be 
22 Ibid, p.30. 
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more effectively channeled to Dutch and French recovery, the US threw off its hands-off 




American intervention at that juncture was episodic and therefore, it does not 
necessarily follow that from 1947 the US would become so directly and deeply involved in 
Southeast Asian affairs.  Historically, American engagement in Southeast Asia has always 
been narrow and focused on maintaining the accessibility of the trade routes that run 
through the region.  In the nineteenth century the economic interest of the US in the Orient 
was ensuring the "open door" to China.  This changed after the 1949 Communist victory in 
China which resulted in the Americans looking to Japan as the lynchpin in East Asia. 
 
This shift was especially important as after the Second World War, American 
policymakers tied the blocking of global Communist advancement to the economic recovery 
of Europe and Japan.  George Kennan’s Containment strategy, articulated in 1949, 
considered the industrial centres of Western Europe and Japan as vital to US interests and 
maintained that the US should focus on rebuilding economic strength there instead of 
spreading finite resources globally.24  This view was also reflected in the Truman 
administration.25
                                                            
23 Ibid, p.27. 
  In December 1949, President Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
warned that "were Japan added to the Communist bloc, the Soviets would acquire skilled 
24 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.40, 57-59. 
25 Ibid, pp.59-60. 
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manpower and industrial potential capable of significantly altering the balance of world 
power."26
 
   
Truman administration officials considered Southeast Asia, a primary producing 
area, vital for Japan's economic recovery.  By mid-1948, American occupation policy in Japan 
focused on reviving Japanese foreign trade which was possible "only if Far Eastern markets 
could be found."27  This "demanded that peace and stability prevailed throughout Southeast 
Asia," requiring that the Viet Minh insurgency be "vanquished with the greatest possible 
dispatch."28
 
  It must be noted that at this juncture, the US still did not have a large physical 
presence in Southeast Asia apart from the military bases in the Philippines.  Therefore, all 
appearances pointed to a policy of minimal engagement in the region to protect historic US 
(and then free-world) strategic, economic and political interests. 
 Notwithstanding the limited US presence in Southeast Asia, State Department 
officials were concerned with protection of the region from Communism.  Containment was 
at the heart of the Cold War waged by the Americans.  It remained the primary justification 
for global American intervention for much of the second half of the twentieth century.   
Foment in the decolonizing areas in Asia, Africa and the Middle East attracted the attention 
of American statesmen as these regions seemed particularly susceptible to Communist 
subversion.  Discussions were held and policy papers were drafted which showed 
Washington's conceptions of various means to handle decolonization and Communist 
subversion.  Concerning Southeast Asia, American policymakers singled out regional 
                                                            
26 Acheson to British Ambassador Oliver Franks, 24 December 1949, Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1949, Vol.7, Part 2, p.927 (hereafter cited as FRUS). 
27 Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.43. 
28 McMahon, Limits of Empire, p.38. 
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cooperation as the solution which accommodated the interests and resource limitations of 
both the free world and indigenous polities.  Rotter argues that the US "promoted a new 
economic regionalism in the Far East, anchored by a benignly industrializing Japan in 
peaceful commercial exchange with underdeveloped Asian nations."29  Indeed, Truman 
administration officials thought that US objectives in the region would best be served by "a 
Far East progressively developing into a group of self-governing states—independent or with 
Dominion status—which would cooperate with each other and with the Western powers on 
a basis of mutual self-respect and friendship" (emphasis added).30
 
  Overall, the plan involved 
keeping the Third World aligned with US objectives and, thereby facilitating the 
Containment of Communism.  American aid and technical assistance would be used to 
encourage Asian states to cooperate with each other based on shared cultural 
characteristics and need for economic development. 
This policy is best articulated in a 1949 Policy Planning Staff (PPS) paper on 
Southeast Asia.  In this document, the American interest was defined as to "encourage the 
SEA region to develop in harmony with the Atlantic Community and the rest of the Free 
World."  It was, "conversely…our [the US] objective to contain and steadily reduce Kremlin 
influence in the region."  Interestingly, State Department officials had "slight hope 
of…achieving either of these objectives through a policy limited to unilateral relations with 
the individual SEA countries."  Instead, they considered "adopt[ing] a wider concept—
multilateral collaboration, primarily with certain British Commonwealth countries and the 
Philippines, in approaching SEA as a region" (emphasis added).31
                                                            
29 Rotter, Path to Vietnam, p.43. 
  Although multilateralism 
30 Policy paper prepared in the Department of State, "An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific 
at the Close of the War and the Objectives and Policies of the United States," 22 June 1945, FRUS 
1945, Vol.6, pp.557-558. 
31 Policy paper prepared in the Department of State, "Policy Planning Staff Paper on United States 
Policy Toward Southeast Asia," 29 March 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol.7, Part 2, p.1129. 
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was applied to the entire region, it appeared to be directed more towards island than 
mainland Southeast Asia, revealing a disjunction in US foreign policy towards the region.  It 
is also significant that Southeast Asian affairs were seen "in the context of a larger area 
embracing non-communist centers of power on either side of and below SEA."  Thus, the 
Americans thought of the region as "an integral part of that great crescent formed by the 
Indian Peninsula, Australia and Japan."32
 
  Southeast Asia was, essentially, subordinated to 
extra-regional concerns and was part of the global system of Communist Containment. 
 With regards to the regional cooperation proper, US officials were keenly aware that 
"the area concerned is primarily Asian."  Thus, they sought "to leaven the oriental nature 
[heavy Asian participation] of the collaboration with sympathetic western influence."  
Washington would not "at the outset urg[e] an area organization" but aimed to control the 
direction of Asian regional initiatives by "exerting a cautiously moderating influence."33  
Curiously, these policymakers seemed to eschew formal regional arrangements, preferring 
instead to work through existing international agencies and bilateral agreements.  The 
foremost reason for this could be that, bearing in mind America's anti-colonial heritage, 
Washington was eager to "minimize suggestions of American imperialist intervention."  They 
preferred, therefore, to "encourage the Indians, Filipinos and other Asian states to take the 
lead in political matters" while providing "discreet support and guidance."34
                                                            
32 Ibid. 
  A second 
reason could be that the Americans were not familiar with multilateralism although it was, 
ideally, a desirable mode of diplomacy because of their lack of experience in such 
institutions.  Prior to the post-1945 period, American diplomacy took the form of unilateral 
declarations or bilateral relations.  This could explain why the US constantly used bilateral 




relations, which could be detriment to regional and collaborative instruments.  In the 
postwar period, suffice it to say that the dual objectives of guiding Southeast Asian regional 
developments to ensure that they remained favourable towards US goals and of not playing 
a dominant leadership role made American regional foreign policy a fine balancing act.  In 
the atmosphere of the emerging Cold War in Asia, it would be extremely difficult to juggle 
these two rather contradictory impulses. 
 
The strategy to achieve these dual purposes involved the use of developmental 
assistance.  American policymakers were aware that economic growth and development 
was of primary importance to postwar Southeast Asian states.  However, to satisfy US 
regional security needs, they wanted to "vigorously…develop the economic 
interdependence between SEA, as a supplier of raw materials, and Japan, western Europe 
and India, as suppliers of finished goods."  This, in effect, meant that in 1949, US officials 
conceived limits to the kind of assistance that could be disbursed to Southeast Asian states.  
But, the US could not afford to lose the support of Asian states by withholding aid.  
Accordingly, the policy paper recommended making "every effort…to initiate and expand 
programs of technical assistance" in order to support the "legitimate aspirations" of 
decolonizing states.35
                                                            
35 Ibid. 
  One can conclude that the US, in order to preserve its economic, 
strategic and Cold War interests, wanted control over the creation and direction of regional 
cooperation in Southeast Asia.  But, the Americans declined taking a dominant role in 
initiating these cooperative mechanisms for fear of stretching limited resources and because 
they did not want to face charges of US imperialism replacing European ones.  Economic and 
technical assistance was deemed to be a promising way to foster a pro-America Third World.  
Moreover, officials of the Truman administration seemed unable to conceive a systematic 
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means to operationalize their ideas on multilateralism and foreign assistance, leaving policy 
implementation vague and on an ad hoc basis.  Nonetheless, the 1949 PPS paper is 
important as it delineated the principles by which US policy towards regional organizations 
in Southeast Asia would be conducted in the following decades. 
 
Despite these considerations in the State Department, Southeast Asia remained 
inconsequential to US and ranked low on Washington's postwar priorities.  The region was 
largely forgotten until the early 1950s.  By then, a radical change in perspective occurred, 
resulting in every major policy paper, strategic assessment and intelligence estimate driving 
home the point that Southeast Asia was a region of vital importance to the US.36  NSC 68, 
drafted in April 1950, just a few months before the outbreak of the Korean War, is the most 
significant example.  It has been argued that the Korean conflict made NSC 68's 
recommended conventional arms buildup and US global military deployment possible.  
Indeed, Truman only signed the document in 1951, during the war itself.   Most scholars are 
in agreement that the Korean War resulted in, or accelerated, the globalization of the Cold 
War and of Containment.37  Hence, from the 1950s onwards, the Cold War expanded from 
the centre, Europe, to the periphery, the colonized areas, of the postwar international 
system because both superpowers identified vital strategic, economic and psychological 
interests in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.38
 
 
                                                            
36 McMahon, Limits of Empire, p.43. 
37 Rosemary Foot, “Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict,” in Michael J. Hogan, editor, America in the 
World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp.296-297. 




US and USSR interests in Asia were historic and limited.  But for the Americans, the 
Korean War, coming on the heels of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and 
Assistance in 1950, solidified their fear of Chinese expansion into the region.  Such evidence 
sufficed to convince US policymakers that the Soviet bloc posed a grave conventional 
military threat in Southeast Asia.  Consequently, American policy in Southeast Asia shifted 
from nonintervention to a direct military commitment to the defence of Japan and the 
Philippines under the auspices of 1951 San Francisco Treaty.39
 
  Henceforth, it is clear from 
Washington's posture towards the region that it had a growing interest towards 
safeguarding it from Communist expansion by military means. 
SEATO: Holding the Line in Southeast Asia 
The next major event that triggered a definitive US commitment to the region was the 
French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent outcome of the Geneva Conference in 
1954.  The Eisenhower administration drew deeply pessimistic conclusions from Geneva, 
despite Soviet and Chinese moderation of Ho Chi Minh’s ambitions to unify Vietnam.  By 
then, US officials were convinced that the Communists were bent on territorial expansion in 
Asia.  President Eisenhower’s first policy paper on the region affirmed 1952's NSC 124/2 
which considered Communist domination in any form in Southeast Asia to “seriously 
endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security 
interests.”40
                                                            
39 Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia and the Great Powers (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.142. 
  For the Third World, Eisenhower believed in the “falling domino principle” 
which postulated that if one country in Asia fell to the communists, other countries would 
40 “Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of 
Action with Respect to Southeast Asia, NSC 124/2, 25 June 1952.”  Mount Holyoke College, The 
Pentagon Papers <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/doc13.htm>, November 2010. 
26 
 
“disintegrat[e]” with “profound influences”.41  Hence, the NSC considered the Geneva 
settlement a “disaster” that was a “major forward stride of Communism which may lead to 
the loss of Southeast Asia” should China use North Vietnam as a base to conquer the 
region.42
 
  The policy of Containment was applied and this entailed building a security system 
in Southeast Asia to limit, or undo, the fallout from the Geneva Conference. 
One immediate outcome was the 1954 creation of SEATO, a collective security 
mechanism.  This was a departure from the directions laid out in the 1949 PPS paper for the 
US was taking the lead in the creation of SEATO and using military means to contain 
Communism in Southeast Asia.  Evidently, the situation was deemed sufficiently dire for 
Washington to pursue this course of action.  SEATO was intended to show American resolve 
and commitment to the region, reassure non-Communist states and deter Chinese 
aggression as China was perceived to be the primary Communist threat in Southeast Asia.  
The US Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that "the aggressive attitude and the growing military 
power of Communist China represent the primary and immediate threat to the non-
Communist countries of the Far East."  They were worried that "with Soviet logistical 
assistance, and by virtue of sheer numbers alone, they [the Chinese] constitute a formidable 
force and one which, if unopposed by United States power, is considered to be capable of 
overrunning all of Southeast Asia."43
                                                            
41 “President Eisenhower's News Conference, April 7, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, 
p.382.”  Mount Holyoke College <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/ps11.htm>, 
November 2010. 
  This drew the US into SEATO.  Sharing similar 
perturbations towards this threat, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Thailand and the UK also signed the Manila Pact in September 1954 which provided for 
SEATO's establishment in February the following year.  SEATO stemmed from the 
42 Thomas G. Patterson and J. Garry Clifford, America Ascendant: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1939 
(Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1995), p.147. 
43 McMahon, Limits of Empire, p.64-65. 
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intersection of two concerns: the Containment of Chinese Communist expansion and the 
resolution of the problems caused by decolonization in Southeast Asia. 
 
SEATO, however, was not simply a response to circumstances in 1954 by the 
Western powers and their allies.  The British also considered some form of regional grouping 
in the area to rehabilitate it from the destruction caused by the Second World War and to 
facilitate decolonization.  But until 1949, the Americans left the management of Southeast 
Asia to Britain.  Tarling argues that it was, in fact, the British who "worked to secure what 
became SEATO."44
 
  Therefore, SEATO, being a direct response to the Korean and Indochinese 
conflicts, also had its roots in broader British policy towards Southeast Asia. 
To deal with the anti-colonial, nationalist impulses in Southeast Asia, British 
policymakers thought that a "regional framework would succeed an imperial one" in which 
they would "take account of regional interests and the attitudes of leaders and peoples in 
the region."  Because many of the problems faced by the emerging states in the Afro-Asian 
world were considered similar, the solutions could be applied regionally.45
                                                            
44 Tarling, Regionalism, p.70. 
  Furthermore, for 
weak decolonizing states, regional groupings could provide a source of diplomatic and 
economic strength through cooperation.  An example of this was the Colombo Plan for Co-
operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, a collaborative framework 
established in November 1950 spearheaded by London and ostensibly designed to promote 
economic development in their colonial areas.  It was born out of the Commonwealth 
Conference of Foreign Ministers held earlier in the year at Colombo, Sri Lanka (Ceylon).  On 
the part of the British, the Colombo Plan was a political calculation.  In the context of the 
45 Ibid., p.69. 
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Cold War and post-war economic recovery, regionalism was fundamentally "designed to 




The "cash-strapped" British desired to secure American financial support for the 
Colombo Plan.47  Washington's initial reluctance to sponsor Britain's Commonwealth 
development program diminished in the wake of the Korean War.  The US thus became the 
Colombo Plan's "most important donor" and joined the association in early 1951.48  
Essentially, decolonization from colony to Commonwealth was a means "ensuring that the 
quarter of the world it was to withdraw from should remain locked into capitalist global 
systems and Western friendship."49  To do this, the British aimed to "commit the US to the 
defence of the region, though without provoking Communist China."50
 
  SEATO presented 
another opportunity to achieve this goal. 
The Americans had different intentions from the British.  However, one can discern 
similar trajectories in UK and US perceptions of the region, especially in the area of nudging 
regional developments into parallel with Western interests.  Basically, US officials were 
reluctant to intervene militarily in Southeast Asia until the Dien Bien Phu crisis.  As late as 
January 1954, Dulles rejected an extension of US security commitments to the region 
because he thought that "the United States should not assume formal commitments which 
overstrain its present capabilities and give rise to military expectations we could not 
                                                            
46 Ibid. 
47 Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945-49 (London: Routledge, 
1995), p.215. 
48 Ibid., 214-215. 
49 Karl Hack, "Theories and Approaches to British Decolonization in Southeast Asia," in Frey et al., 
p.109. 
50 Tarling, Regionalism, p.70. 
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fulfill."51  This was soon changed as in the same month, NSC 5405 was approved which 
entailed a coordinated defense of non-Communist Southeast Asia.  The document 
articulated the same ideas and principles as the 1949 PPS paper but with an important 
difference.  NSC 5405 explicitly mentioned "that the initiative in regional defense measures 
must come from the governments of the area."52  This is significant as it shows US 
willingness to consider collective security as the basis for the regional organization of 
Southeast Asia.  With the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, both the UK and the 
US publicly announced that they were willing "to take part, with other countries principally 
concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense…to assure 
the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific."53
 
  The British 
and the Americans differed on the time and procedure to produce a regional security pact 
but the resultant discussions to attain this end eventually led to the creation of SEATO.  The 
organization's development has been adequately researched elsewhere.  I will focus on its 
implications on regionalism in Southeast Asia. 
SEATO was an important mechanism for Washington to secure Southeast Asia from 
Communist expansion.  Upset at the outcome of the Geneva Conference in 1954, the US 
refused to sign the Geneva Accords and sought to repair the damage done to their regional 
interests.  SEATO was used to "salvage something" in Southeast Asia.54  Under the Accords, it 
was "forbidden" for South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to join SEATO.55
                                                            
51 Cited in Kai Dreisbach, "Between SEATO and ASEAN: The United States and the Regional 
Organization of Southeast Asia," in Frey et al., p.246. 
  The Americans, in 
deference to the British and the French, agreed not to include the Indochinese states in 
52 NSC 5405, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," FRUS 
1952-54, Vol.12, Part 1, pp.371. 
53 Cited in Dreisbach, "SEATO and ASEAN," p.246. 
54 George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: 
McGraw Hill, Inc.), p.41. 
55 Damien Fenton, To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p.27. 
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SEATO.  In return for this concession, the Americans won their agreement for an inclusion of 
a protocol to the Manila Treaty that SEATO "reserved the right to treat any threat to the 
stability and security of the three newly independent Indochinese states as a threat to the 
alliance itself."56
 
  It was a way for the US to circumvent the Geneva Accords in order to 
ensure that Southeast Asia would not be lost to Communist expansion. 
SEATO was similar to its cousin, NATO, as it was the basis of the Containment of 
Communism in Southeast Asia.  Yet, it was foundationally different as it did not obligate its 
members to assist each other in the event of a military threat.57
                                                            
56 Ibid. 
  This has led to criticism that 
SEATO was merely a paper tiger as it had no military means to buttress its anti-Communist 
mission.  Regardless, SEATO is historically important to the development of regionalism in 
Southeast Asia.  It can be distinguished from all other regional bodies to date such as ECAFE 
and the Colombo Plan whose focus was on economic cooperation.  Significantly, SEATO's 
signatories and treaty area demarcated, in terms of policy, mainland and island Southeast 
Asia in the minds of US policymakers.  Consequently, Washington perceived two Southeast 
Asias.  Thailand, contiguous with Malaya, straddled both sub-regions.  SEATO's 
establishment effected two approaches to regionalism and American involvement in the 
region.  The mainland was militarized and the islands remained on the 1949 PPS policy track 
of economic-based multilateralism.  Considering Washington's initial design for regional 
cooperation in post-war Southeast Asia, SEATO was a circumstantial development that 
diverted US policy from its original track.  Therefore, the overriding emphasis in the 
literature on US military involvement in the region and on SEATO distorts the post-war focus 
of US intent towards Southeast Asia. 




Economic and wider cultural and ideological reasons also directed the Americans to 
have such a prominent role in founding SEATO.  Firstly, American officials thought it 
imperative to put up a show of force to stand against Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia.  
The line of thinking was that should China succeed in its Communist crusade, it could "force 
Japan to terms, because of her dependence upon the resources of this area for her 
livelihood."  This would be devastating for US security interests as Japan, the keystone of 
America foreign policy in Asia, would have to reach an "accommodation with the Communist 
bloc" for the sake of its survival and prosperity.58
 
  Southeast Asia was considered to be the 
primary-resource area for Japan.  SEATO could not be divorced from US economic 
deliberations.  Secondly, geography also necessitated such a move by US to secure its 
position in the region.   Unlike China which was connected to Southeast Asia via a 
continuous landmass, the US is separated from the region by the Pacific Ocean.  Thus, there 
was a greater need to make American presence concrete in Southeast Asia, thereby giving 
credibility to US might and promises. 
Finally, the notion of US credibility should be explored in order to understand 
American motivations for making a monumental decision to militarily involve itself in 
Southeast Asia in the form of SEATO.  Generally, Communism seemed to Americans an 
unstoppable entity which seeped through any small gap in Western defence, thus 
necessitating Containment.  Concurrently, they were fixated on maintaining US credibility to 
keep its word and demonstrating its trustworthiness to allies by means of tangible 
involvement in international conflicts to stop the Communist advance.  Moreover, this had 
to be continually enforced to bolster and perpetuate the image of US resolve and strength.  
                                                            
58 McMahon, Limits of Empire, p.65. 
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All these perceptions and resultant policies point to fears and insecurities in the American 
psyche and are the basis of US nationalism. 
 
Yet, one is surprised that Washington did not decree more drastic actions to contain 
Communism than creating regional security organizations and supporting its allies.  This 
restraint can be explained by the character of the Eisenhower administration.  It remained 
fiscally conservative, choosing to meet the Communist threat with asymmetrical means by 
threatening “Massive Retaliation” against any form of Communist provocation.  Alliances 
such as SEATO would also deal with local Communist aggression so that the US would not 
overextend its resources.59  John Lewis Gaddis concludes that this was the “common thread” 
tying together US policies during the 1950s.60
 
  The pursuit of Containment on a budget was 
at the core of the Eisenhower regime. 
But SEATO was a flawed organization because of the manifold objectives and 
deliberations of the US and its allies.  Its integrity as a Southeast Asian collective defence 
organization was further undermined by its membership.  A glance of the founding members 
reveal only two Southeast Asian states, Thailand and Philippines, which were openly aligned 
with the Western world.  The rest, except Pakistan, were Western countries.  SEATO seemed 
to be a neo-imperialist tool to keep the decolonizing states in dependence on the West in 
the post-imperial era.  To Southeast Asian states which were predominantly concerned at 
preserving sovereignty, association with SEATO might be undesirable. 
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Nonetheless, Southeast Asian nation-states benefitted from participation in or 
association with SEATO.  Thailand joined SEATO to gain US aid and guarantees for their 
security against Communism in Indochina.  Thus, Thailand and the US shared the same goal 
in this regard.61  Pakistan and the Philippines did not face the same threat but likewise saw 
membership in SEATO as a means to gain US aid and security benefits in other areas.62  
Furthermore, Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam gained SEATO protection even though 
they were prohibited from any military agreements with other powers.63
 
  Lastly, one must 
also remember that during the period when SEATO was formed, some Southeast Asian 
nation-states had not achieved independence.  Nevertheless, the British colonies, Singapore, 
Malaya and Brunei, would fall under the ambit of SEATO as Britain was a signatory.  Simply 
put, the majority of Asian states were associated with SEATO in one way or another and this 
legacy, in time, would impact indigenous regional organizations. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, US regional policy in Southeast Asia served strategic and economic objectives 
of the Cold War.  In the late 1940s, American policymakers favoured the use of regional 
cooperation based on economic assistance to ensure the alignment of the Southeast Asian 
decolonizing states with free world interests.  Thus, it was the carrot that would persuade 
regional leaders that the interests of their budding states would be best served by siding 
with the US and its allies.  US power and influence would be wielded providing an indirect, 
supportive and moderating role to the development of regional organizations.  However, 
this policy changed in the 1950s with the Dien Bien Phu debacle, resulting in US intervention 
and the adoption of military, instead of economic, methods to prevent Southeast Asia from 
                                                            
61 Ibid., pp.28-32. 
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falling to Communism.  SEATO was thus formed in 1954 with the US as a major partner.  This 
departure cemented the division in US policy towards mainland and maritime Southeast 
Asia.  However, the economic thrust of US regional policy towards the island part lingered.  
From the mid- to late 1950s onwards, as SEATO proved to be less effective than expected, 
the US would return to economic tools to further their interests in Southeast Asia.  As a 
result, regional cooperative efforts again emphasized developmental assistance.  Broadly 
speaking, SEATO can be considered to be anomalous in Southeast Asian regionalism.  In the 





Trends and Problems: Emerging Southeast Asian Regionalism 
and US Multilateralism, 1955-58 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores American foreign policy and regionalism in Southeast Asia during the 
years 1955-58 of the second Eisenhower administration.  This period saw the increase in US 
military presence and developmental assistance to Southeast Asia as Washington grappled 
with the changing landscape of the Cold War.  Nation-building wars in former colonial areas 
were fought and the US, because of humanitarian and Cold War strategic reasons, was 
compelled to meet the demands of the Third World for economic, technical and military aid.  
Thus, the US increasingly took on the role of aid-giver.  Having few models, however, to 
address the allocation and disbursement of assistance to maintain and further American 
interests, the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations experimented with 
different strategies, ideas and methods, resulting in a plethora of aid organizations and 
mechanisms added to the existing range of US diplomatic tools.  This chapter studies the 
emergence of key developmental theories, the forms which they took in US foreign policy 
and how they intersected, or not, with the needs of the nation-states and other historical 




The Inception of "Modernization" and "Development" in American Diplomatic History 
Scholars of American diplomatic history have used many approaches to understand US 
foreign relations during the Cold War era.  Words such as "containment" and "national 
security" indicate various paradigms of understanding the philosophy and conduct of US 
international relations.  The terms "modernization" and "development" can be considered 
some of the late additions to this bag of catchwords.  These two words have been used 
loosely in the previous chapter but, in order that the perspectives of US policymakers in the 
1950s may be engaged, they will now assume their ideological baggage.  Historian Nick 
Cullather explains the workings of "modernization" and "development" in American foreign 
relations succinctly: 
In the United States and around the world, modernization 
put forward a whole new vocabulary of international 
relations.  Modernization theory, sometimes called 
development doctrine, supplied the working concepts 
through which the United States understood its obligations 
to unindustrialized, newly-independent nations in the last 
half of the twentieth century....As both an ideology and 
discourse, modernization comprised a set of ideas and 
strategies that guided policies toward foreign aid, trade, 
nationalism, and counterinsurgency.  Among its core 
precepts was the idea that the state of economic and 
political advancement enjoyed by the United States and the 
industrialized West was normative, and that the progress of 
the other two thirds of humanity toward convergence at a 
comparable level could be accelerated.  This process, called 
development, was the responsibility of ministries, banks, 




Furthermore, the ideology of "modernization" and "development" actually predates the 
Cold War.  Michael Adas argues that during the interwar years, "America's path to political 
stability and prosperity through the rational management of its resources, through the 
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application of science and technology to mass production, and through efforts to adapt the 
principles of scientific investigation to the study of human behavior was increasingly held up 
as the route that 'underdeveloped' and unstable societies were destined to travel as they 
'entered the modern age.'"65  Yet, it was only during the 1950s that this ideology was "fully 
articulated…when its ascendancy was buoyed by Cold War imperatives and it was recast in 
the development jargon of the post-World War II era."66
 
 
In the 1950s, two struggles meshed and confronted American thinkers, policymakers 
and officials.  They were: the endeavours of postcolonial states to enter modernity; and the 
US attempt to prevent these states from falling into the Communist orbit while they pursued 
progress.  US officials engaged the issue in a nationalist, self-interest driven, fashion.  The 
question that preoccupied American policymakers was how the US could defeat 
Communism and create an international order in which America's liberal, capitalist and 
pluralist values could survive and prosper.67  To the newly emerging nation-states, the 
Communist world offered Lenin's philosophy that linked socialism with the struggle for 
independence.  The Soviet experience of rapid industrialization and development from a 
backward state to a world power overwhelmingly demonstrated the success of the 
Communist model.  US officials and intellectuals were thus extremely concerned that 
postcolonial nation-states would gravitate to the Soviet orbit in order to replicate the USSR's 
results.68
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  Moreover, the Free World did not have any similar blueprint and its endeavours to 
bring about such civilization change were tainted with a recent history of Western European 
66 Ibid. 
67 Michael E. Latham, "Introduction," in Engerman et al., p.2. 
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imperialism and colonialism.  The US position, although boasting an anti-colonial tradition, 
was also tenuous as it retained unequal relations with territories such as Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands.  In order to rise to the challenge posed by the Communist world, it was 
therefore necessary for the US and its allies to articulate and adopt a new paradigm.  Thus 
from the early 1950s onwards, there was an outpouring of scholarship, in which academics 
and intellectuals in the American government, think tanks and tertiary institutions tackled 
the principles and methods by which a budding nation-state could catapult from 
backwardness to modernity. 
 
American social scientists were responsible for repackaging the old "civilizing 
mission" into a universally applicable modernization theory.  This was explicitly to "counter 
the appeal of Leninism in postcolonial countries" and is exemplified by the writings of Walt 
Whitman Rostow.69   Rostow's ideas on how to modernize a nation-state originated in the 
early 1950s and codified into his 1960 book, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto.  It was intended to contest Karl Marx's The Communist Manifesto.  
Rostow's theory is, therefore, strikingly similar in form to Marx's.70  As an American roadmap 
for modernity, however, key differences exist.  Like the theories of Lenin and Marx, Rostow's 
thesis saw history as "stages" of progress towards a secular utopia and this process could be 
"accelerated by the right kinds of leaders."71
                                                            
69 Ibid., p.48-49. 
  As they sprung from the Enlightenment, these 
ideas also contained the notion that the immense diversity in the world would in time 
"converge" on a single modernity.  Technology and industrialization were perceived as the 
keys to achieving this convergence as they could seemingly be transplanted across cultures.  
Thus in these aspects, modernization theory can be considered "a kind of capitalist mirror 




image of Leninism [which was] shorn of class struggle as its central historical motor.  Instead 
of projecting the Soviet Union…as the final culmination of history, the modernization 
theorists…imagined the United States as the apex of development." 72
 
  It can be argued that 
US technical aid and development programs were the means by which American 
policymakers sought to replicate their society in the decolonizing world and, therefore, 
make postcolonial nations amenable towards US goals and interests. 
The impact of intellectuals, academics and modernization-minded individuals on 
American foreign policy should not be underestimated as they occupied key positions in or 
had advisory relationships with the US government.  For example, Rostow had consulted 
with the Eisenhower administration and various government bodies in the 1950s while he 
was still an academic at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  Furthermore, he was 
influential on President John F. Kennedy's thinking on economic development in the Third 
World.  Moreover, when he joined the Kennedy administration he intended to "[convert] his 
economic ideas into policy action."73
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  Another example is Eugene R. Black, who was the 
President of the World Bank from 1949 to 1963 and appointed by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson as Special Adviser to the President on Southeast Asian Social and Economic 
Development in 1966.  In this capacity, Black toured Southeast Asia to solicit support for US 
developmental initiatives in the region.  The presence of these individuals brought the 
scholarly discourse of the time into Washington and shaped foreign policymaking.  A 
prominent scholar has argued that "reconceptualizing the Cold War as part of contemporary 
international history" instead of narrower "political conflict between two power blocs" 
requires that historians devote new attention to the global relationships among "ideology, 




technology, and the Third World."74
 
  This chapter thus seeks to scrutinize these relationships 
with respect to Southeast Asian regionalism. 
The Second Eisenhower Administration, Southeast Asian Regionalism and the Bandung 
Conference 
In addition to defence, Eisenhower as President was just as interested in the economic well-
being of the US and the Free World.  In May 1953, he proposed to Congress the 
establishment of a Commission on Foreign Economic Policy to conduct a review of US global 
economic relationships.  This Commission was headed by Clarence B. Randall and it was 
charged in all of its findings and recommendations "to follow one guiding principle: what is 
best in the national interest."75  The Commission was eventually formalized into the Council 
of Foreign Economy Policy (CFEP) in December 1954 and was chaired by Joseph M. Dodge.76
 
  
US foreign assistance was a key aspect scrutinized by the Commission.  Its recommendations 
on American aid responded to the exigencies of the mid-1950s and signaled a change in US 
participation in multilateralism. 
By the mid-1950s, US policymakers were troubled by what seemed to be an evolving 
Communist threat.  This was coupled with an international scene that witnessed the rise of 
Third World voices which required nuances in the mode and conduct of US foreign policy.  
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NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy," 5 January 1955, captures the Eisenhower 
administration's sentiments toward shifting global dynamics.  Essentially, the USSR 
"appeared to be metamorphosing into a very different kind of enemy" as the Khrushchev 
regime, in adopting a more conciliatory approach to the Free World and calling for peaceful 
co-existence, seemed to be "simply altering tactics, not changing fundamental goals."77  This 
view of the enemy solidified by end 1955 as the Soviets started dabbling in developmental 
aid.  Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev thought that actively cultivating Third World friends 
through aid and trade offers could "bolster the neutralist inclinations" of the decolonizing 
nation-states, thus "diluting the military and economic strength that the West derived from 
its ties to the developing nations."78  Southeast Asian developments certainly contributed to 
Washington's anxieties in this regard.  The USSR offered economic assistance to India, 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Burma, Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Turkey.  McMahon writes while 
Soviet aid promises were "quite modest," US officials "feared that they might nonetheless 
undermine U.S. influence throughout the developing world."79
 
  
At the same time, State Department officials discussed suggested courses of action 
to resolve Southeast Asian problems.  A key document was a NSC paper that eventually 
became NSC 5506, “Future U.S. Economic Assistance for Asia,” 21 January 1955.80
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(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.71. 
  The 
region seemed particularly troubling to American officials by the mid-1950s as indigenous 
polities began contending for their places and voices in the Cold War world.  Burma, 
Cambodia and Indonesia were perceived to be steadfast in their non-aligned stance and 
78 Ibid., pp.72-73. 
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even the stalwart US allies, Thailand and the Philippines, were seen as 
"ambivalent…buffeted by…nationalist and neutralist currents flowing throughout the 
region."81
 
  "In view of the gravity and uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation" and "the 
magnitude and effectiveness of Communist bloc economic programs," it was deemed 
necessary to review US economic assistance policy.  But, the issue was that, fundamentally, 
Washington officials were unable to establish a coherent framework to address how aid 
disbursement could achieve US goals in this new environment.  Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs Charles F. Baldwin criticized that "the manner in 
which the problem under consideration [US assistance] is approached" was "indecisive, if 
not almost diffident and reluctant" and NSC 5506 "[does] not suggest that something new 
and different should be done." 
Besides questioning the rationale and "unenthusiastic attitude" of this NSC study, 
Baldwin was concerned that the Eisenhower administration's "public allusions" to the 
reconsideration of US economic aid policy would raise expectations "in many foreign 
countries…that something more in the way of U.S. aid for Asia is contemplated."82  In light of 
the scheduled African-Asian (Bandung) Conference, which could have a detrimental impact 
on US interests, policymakers like Baldwin thought that it was necessary that American aid 
policy be neither "tawdry showmanship or ballyhoo," nor too expensive or "too badly 
directed to accomplish long-term desirable results."83
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  These criticisms reflect somewhat the 
realism about and shortcomings of the style of US foreign policy under Eisenhower in the 
mid-1950s.  It was no longer possible to simply rely on American power and prestige to 
82 Document 3, "Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic 
Affairs (Baldwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)," 14 January 





prevent the Third World from falling to Communism.  Instead purposeful and substantive 
assistance programs were deemed increasingly necessary to address the changing 
international landscape. 
 
The Bandung Conference, held from 18-24 April 1955, was a prime example of the 
evolving global political scene.  This event was significant for Southeast Asian regionalism in 
two regards. Firstly, Bandung was the first large-scale conference in which the Third World 
began tentative steps towards regional cooperation and solidarity.  This was also an 
unprecedented indigenous attempt at regionalism in Asia and, because of the participation 
of Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, the Conference's ideals became a key influence 
on ASEAN.  It was a "crucial moment in the development of thinking about regional 
identities."84  Bandung espoused a pan-Asian identity for the decolonizing world, 
emphasized “neutralism,” “peaceful coexistence” among member states and with the major 
powers and represented the decolonizing world's attempt to steer clear of Cold War 
politics.85
 
  Thus, the Conference was an important historical precedent for the Third World in 
using regionalism to assert independence and commonality in a polarized international 
order. 
Additionally, coming on the heels of the establishment of SEATO, Bandung 
challenged the pro-Western SEATO as an organization that could articulate and protect the 
interests of Southeast Asian nation-states.  Southeast Asian participants at the Bandung 
Conference, Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 
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and the Philippines, outnumbered those of SEATO, giving Bandung the credibility SEATO 
lacked among the Afro-Asian states.  Most crucially, Bandung can be said to be a truly Third 
World initiative, unlike SEATO which comprised mostly Western countries and clearly 
formed to maintain their interests in the Third World.  In the Cold War context, the Bandung 
Conference was also dangerous for US interests in Southeast Asia because of the 
propaganda opportunity it gave to the Communist bloc.  Because the PRC was present at 
Bandung, the British and Americans were extremely concerned that the Conference would 
be hijacked by Communism to be an “excellent forum (for Zhou [Enlai]) to broadcast 
communist ideology to a naïve audience of anti-colonialism” and to “outflank and 
undermine SEATO and the Colombo Plan.”86
 
 
Race, East-West relations and the Cold War 
The Cold War should not be the only paradigm through which America's attitude to the 
Bandung Conference, and Southeast Asia, is analyzed.   Racial perceptions and prejudices 
continued to inform the perspectives of US officials.  Matthew Jones argues that, "The idea 
of being 'swamped' by an overwhelming Asian tide was never very far beneath the surface 
of the Western imagination."87  Thus, when amalgamated with the Cold War, this 
"apocalyptic" struggle was one in which "Soviet imperialism plus Chinese imperialism, [and] 
overwhelming combinations of Asian populations" threatened to overrun "Western…white 
civilization."88
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  In this regard, the PRC's attendance at Bandung highlighted graphic imageries 
of American vulnerabilities, contributing to the discomfort US policymakers felt about the 
Conference. 
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Indeed, Washington was sensitive to connotations of racism when dealing with the 
Bandung Conference.  Race, tied up with anti-colonialism, was a touchy subject for 
Bandung's Asian participants.  As early as 1953, the Operations Coordinating Board reported 
that American prestige in the Far East suffered primarily because of "racial sensitivity and 
antipathy to [the] Western powers" and the "persistent belief, despite U.S. professions to 
contrary, that U.S. peoples and practices do not accord Asiatic governments genuinely equal 
status with [the] Western powers."89  Therefore, in the process of furthering US interests in 
Southeast Asia, there remained the "compelling need [for American officials] to avoid any 
appearance of racism, to discard any association with the language and attitudes of 




The twin issues of race and regionalism also coalesced and resulted in a colour-line 
cemented between Southeast Asian regional organizations.  Although the SEATO treaty had 
already been signed in 1954, the first formal meeting to establish the organization occurred 
in February 1955, just two months before the Bandung Conference was slated to meet.  
Naturally, Washington was extremely disturbed by the implications of these meetings.  
Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson pointed out the stark racial contrast between 
SEATO and Bandung: the "Bangkok Conference with mostly whites and a few Asian people, 
and their [Bandung] conference would be practically all colored."91
based on totally opposed concepts of the dangers facing 
Asia now.  The eight nations gathering at the Thai capital will 
work on the premise that Communist expansion is the 
  In February 1955, the 
New York Times commented that these two conferences were 
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enemy; the conference of some thirty nations at Bandung 
has been planned on the premise that Western, white man's 
colonialism is the principal menace confronting Asia and 
Africa.92
Therefore, SEATO and the Colombo Plan, though together boasting a membership of many 
Asian states, could not escape the impression that they were Western organizations with 
Western countries exercising a paternalistic, and even perceptibly neo-imperialist, role in 
arranging the defense of Southeast Asia.  This division was sharpened with the Bandung 
Conference displaying a distinct non-aligned stance.  Thus, the advent of Bandung 
crystallized two dichotomies of the 1950s in Southeast Asia: Race and the Cold War.  In 
terms of regionalism, the Cold War lines were drawn between SEATO and the Colombo Plan 
vs. Bandung, Western-sponsored and leaning regional organizations vs. Asian-initiated ones. 
 
 
Bandung's impact diminished towards the end of the 1950s because ideological and 
nationalist considerations won over goodwill and sustained cooperation between 
participating states.93
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  By the end of the 1950s, it was effectively a defunct grouping whose 
significance for Southeast Asian regionalism lay in the ideals it espoused.  Certainly, the 
desire by Asian states to chart an independent path during the Cold War and Third World 
solidarity was a constant refrain in their regionalism.  Thus, although ASEAN was formed 
under different circumstances and motivations, it is essential to recognize that because 
SEATO and the Bandung Conference preceded ASEAN, there would undoubtedly be 
continuities that merit exploration.  In retrospect, British and American anxieties about 
Bandung were unfounded.  Yet, it was a source of apprehension to Washington.  The sum of 
these manifold challenges in the 1950s therefore prompted shifts in US foreign assistance 
policy. 
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Passing of a Period?: Multilateralism and Development in US Foreign Policy 
By the time of the Bandung Conference, Washington had plans already underway to mount 
a renewed offensive against the Communist initiatives in the developing world.  SEATO and 
the Colombo Plan were integral to this revision of US regional foreign policy because they 
tackled Southeast Asian security problems from military and non-military angles.  In 
December 1954, NSC 5429/5, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with respect to 
Southeast Asia," stated that the aim of US policy was the "creation in Asia of political and 
social forces which will zealously spread the greater values of the Free World and 
simultaneously expose the falsity of the Communist ideological offensive."94  US forces then 
in the region would serve as "clear evidence of U.S. intention to contribute its full share of 
effective collective aid to the nations of the area against the Communist threat…[thereby 
providing them] assurance…of U.S. intent and determination to support them in the event of 
Communist aggression."95
Encourage the prompt organization of an economic 
grouping by the maximum number of free Asian states, 
including Japan and as many of the Colombo Powers as 
possible based on self-help and mutual aid, and the 
participation and support (including substantial financial 
assistance) of the United States and other appropriate 
Western countries, through which, by united action, those 
free Asian states will be enabled more effectively to achieve 
the economic and social strength needed to maintain their 
independence (emphasis added).
  SEATO's military role was thus modified from the overt 
prevention of Chinese Communist territorial expansion to a guarantee of American aid and 
commitment to the nation-building efforts in emerging states in Southeast Asia.  The 
economic emphasis in regional cooperation was thus revived because of the need to address 
the changed circumstances of the Cold War conflict.  A method to do this was to: 
96
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Economic and technical aid would be provided in South and Southeast Asia "through [this] 
economic grouping…or otherwise" to be "used effectively to accelerate the present slow 
rates of economic growth, and to give…the peoples in these areas a sense of present 
progress and future hope, which is [perceived to be] currently lacking" (emphasis added).  
Education, cultural and training programs provided by "qualified Americans" would, 
hopefully, create "free Asian leaders" who would be instrumental in achieving American 
goals in the regions concerned.97
 
  NSC 5429/5 therefore recommends an adaptation in the 
purpose and conduct of US foreign assistance policy to one that actively collaborates with 
Free World partners and creates economic cooperative mechanisms in Asia with the aim to 
bring about progress and development in emerging nation-states.  This would then secure 
the region from further Communist penetration. 
 The Council on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP) was at the forefront of implementing 
the change in US foreign policy from military to non-military multilateralism.  In the 
immediate post-Second World War era, the US conducted its diplomacy in Southeast Asia 
predominantly on a bilateral basis even though American officials toyed with the idea of 
regional cooperation.   By the mid-1950s, collaboration with other states seemingly offered 
new possibilities to handle the challenges of the era.  The CFEP thought that existing US 
assistance programs were "designed in terms of the relationship between the United States 
and the particular country in question, rather than in terms of the relationship of the Asian 
countries with each other, or of Southeast Asia as a whole."  They were also short-term 
measures to deal with emergencies stemming from post-war economic recovery.98
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therefore unsuitable for regionalism as bilateral aid lacked long-term purpose, sustainability 
and could undermine regional projects. 
 
Furthermore, the new multilateralism appealed to many US officials for several 
reasons.  Firstly, it increased the acceptability of US aid.  Existing assistance, "unilateral aid," 
was politically unattractive to recipient states as it was often regarded as "aid with strings 
attached" and, therefore, "resented."  Secondly, it would "facilitate contributions from other 
industrialized countries," thereby "reduc[ing] the requirements for aid from the United 
States."99
period [in US diplomacy] is passing.  This is the time for 
reappraisal, and for making a determined effort to provide 
the leadership that may serve to draw the nations of the 
area into closer economic relationships so that the strength 
of one may serve to offset the weakness of another, and the 
collective well-being be made to rest more upon mutual and 
complementary effort, and less upon the resources of the 
United States (emphasis added).
  It was in this context that Clarence B. Randall, the second Chairman of the CFEP, 




With Third World allegiances seemingly wooed by the Soviets in the form of developmental 
aid and neutralist, often pro-USSR regionalism, and with existing West-oriented regional 
arrangements appearing to be floundering, Washington considered it necessary to 
reinvigorate regional economic cooperation to attract Asian states into the US orbit and to 
cut American spending on foreign assistance.  This approach can be interpreted as part of 
Eisenhower's fiscally conservative foreign policy regime and hence, mere window-dressing 
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for appearances' sake.  But, the extent of internal discussions in the US government on a 
multilateral framework for aid reflected his bold and realistic style. 
 
As part of the transition to multilateralism, US officials judged the Colombo Plan to 
be a promising mechanism, complementary to SEATO, to handle economic problems in 
Southeast Asia.  Discussions in Washington envisioned a Colombo Plan expanded from a 
collection of bilateral arrangements into a multilateral organization and Eisenhower 
proposed a fund of $200 million to support such regional development.101
 
  However, this 
venture soon stalled as there was a mismatch of expectations from the US and Asian 
members of the Colombo Plan.  The sense of optimism towards multilateralism was 
dampened when it became clear after the Bandung Conference that the Americans faced 
multiple problems in making the Colombo Plan a regional organization that would be useful 
and acceptable to all parties.  This was demonstrated in the May 1955 Simla Conference, 
which followed immediately after Bandung. 
The Simla meeting was, in fact, suggested by the Director of Foreign Operations 
Administration, Governor Harold E. Stassen, to the Indian Finance Officer as Washington "in 
the formulation of its aid programs would appreciate having the views of the Asian members 
of the Colombo Plan."  However, this led to "considerable misunderstanding" among them, 
leading them to be "particularly apprehensive" that the Americans "in spite of…assurances 
to the contrary, was giving active consideration to changing the method of its aid 
distribution from a bilateral pattern to a multilateral one and intended to give high priority 
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to regional projects."102  The US probably desired a formal, Colombo Plan-like organization 
to channel American assistance to individual countries for developmental purposes.  
Because the $200 million was not earmarked for specific countries but was targeted at the 
regional level, recipient countries were concerned that they would have to compete and 
therefore, possibly receive less aid than before.  Asian states likely hoped that the proposed 
fund would be additional assistance separate from bilateral aid.  The Indian version of the 
agenda for Simla apparently discussed the problems and utilizations of US aid and suggested 
that the proposed fund be used to facilitate trade and help Asian states tide over acute 
economic difficulties.103
 
  Asian leaders envisioned $200 million for contingencies and the 
implementation of broad economic frameworks, not for the more imperative national 
development. 
These misunderstandings required that a telegram from Secretary of State Dulles 
be sent out on 3 May clarifying that while the US approved of setting up regional 
organizations and greater economic cooperation between countries, Washington would 
continue "aid on a bilateral basis and would not favor multilateral recommendations or 
negotiations regarding US aid to countries of Asia."104
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  American officials seemingly did not 
grasp and establish the relationship between bilateralism and multilateralism in their foreign 
policy, resulting in somewhat conflicting signals sent to the Asian states.  Another related 
issue was the US government's ambivalence towards the extent of American influence in 
103 Footnotes 4 and 5 of Document 49, Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Certain 
Diplomatic Missions, 3 May 1955, FRUS 1955-57, Vol.21, 
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multilateral organizations.  Many American policymakers questioned the viability of 
converting the Colombo Plan into a regional organization to achieve the desired US 
objectives because they considered it "a group which is socialist in influence, and British in 
background."  Its British roots and orientation could hinder the furtherance of American 
interests in Southeast Asia. 
 
This episode demonstrates several pertinent aspects of US foreign policy regarding 
multilateralism in the mid-1950s.  Firstly, the US would disburse aid in ways it saw fit and did 
not seem to be sufficiently open-minded to the needs of Colombo Plan Asian countries.  
Washington was more directive than cooperative.  This was in spite of American 
policymakers considering the Colombo Plan as the basis of further Southeast Asian political 
and economic integration.  Secondly, it also shows that even though the Americans sought 
to adopt a multilateral diplomatic framework, their inexperience hindered their breaking out 
of bilateralism.  Finally, even as the Asian members of the Colombo Plan discussed the use of 
US aid for regional programs, bilateral, rather than multilateral assistance, preoccupied their 
attention.  In an evaluation of the Simla Conference, American officials and some Asian 
delegates present at the Conference concluded that "in view [of the] lack [of] clear 
indication from United States side that President’s fund was intended preferentially for 
regional purposes, all delegations with sole exception of Japanese expressed desire [to] give 
priority…in use foreign aid to national rather than regional development (i.e., existing 
pattern)."105
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  Asian states feared that moving forward with the US proposal would limit 




The positions and interests of Asian states must also be accounted for.  Some of 
the Colombo Plan's Asian members had their own considerations in not embracing 
multilateralism.  Smaller Asian states, such as Indonesia, feared that "Japan and India might 
use [the] regional approach [in US assistance to] build up their own prestige and economic 
position at [the] expense smaller countries" in projects involving greater intra-regional 
cooperation.  There was concern that regional arrangements would not result in an 
equitable distribution of aid.  These states were also unconvinced that the Colombo Plan 
should be converted into a full-fledged regional organization.  They "feared this as [a] step 
toward dominance of region by Japan and India."106
 
  The concern with protecting national 
sovereignty, therefore, did not merely apply to Western powers reasserting control over the 
Third World.  The newly emerging nation-states were careful to prevent foreign domination 
by any party.  Decolonizing states fiercely safeguarding national sovereignty throughout the 
post-Second World War era was a significant force in directing the philosophy and form of 
regionalism in Southeast Asia. 
 The final consideration on the part of Asian states was the "basic problem 
of…relationships between regional and national development problems."107  US officials 
concluded that a key issue was that "Asian countries were not receptive to the formation of 
any regional organization that would influence the size of bilateral aid programs to individual 
countries."  As long as regional initiatives "did not detract from resources available for 
national development programs," they were welcomed.108
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  It seems that the unclear 
relationship between bilateral and regional aid in US foreign policy complicated the problem 
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of uniting Asian states through regionalism to withstand Communist penetration in the 
region.  The Asian states were protective of their share of the aid pie and were thus 
unwilling to support programs that could threaten it.  Yet, the Americans could not shrink 
back from their initiatives for, "now that United States Government has initiated first serious 
consideration of regional, as distinct from purely national development, Asian countries 
would be discouraged and confused if we [the US] suddenly dropped idea."109
 
 
 These considerations continued to pose problems for the development of 
regionalism in Southeast Asia.  Notwithstanding the issues, the Eisenhower Administration 
attempted to move multilateralism forward.  In the second half of 1957, the Committee on 
Asian and Regional Economic Development and Cooperation was assembled.  It aims were: 
1. To examine and evaluate previous experience and 
recommendations in this field. 
2. To consider the...questions: 
a. Would economic development and cooperation in Asia 
be improved and facilitated by multilateral treatment? 
b. To what extent will Asian governments and private 
groups increasingly recognize the value of and 
participate in regional or inter-Asian economic 
development and cooperation? 
c. Would expanded Asian regional economic development 
and cooperation advance U.S. interests and policy 
objectives? 
d. What existing or additional forms of regional 
association, public and private, would be desirable to 
encourage in order to promote accelerated economic 
development and cooperation in Asia?110
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Thereafter, the Committee was: 
5. To make findings and recommendations on: 
a. Items suitable for regional economic development and 
cooperation in Asia. 
b. Ways and means for expanding regional economic 
development in Asia. 
c. Adequacy of U.S. policies, organization, and operations 




This represented a serious effort to redress the mix of seemingly insoluble issues 
surrounding multilateralism in Southeast Asia.  Indeed, the Committee's findings and 
recommendations were considered at NSC and DOS meetings.  Nevertheless, there was 
already an impasse on the development of regional organizations to realize the American 
vision of security in the Far East because Southeast Asians were reluctant to cooperate with 
the US to this end. 
 
The DOS responses to the Committee's suggestions reveal this.  As there was 
agreement in the US government to work within existing regional mechanisms, DOS officials 
hoped to further regionalism in Southeast Asia by utilizing the Colombo Plan meeting in the 
US in 1958 "as a sounding board for advancing suggestions and ideas for promoting greater 
regional cooperation in the area."112
                                                            
111 Ibid., p.2. 
  But they realized that, "given the prevailing reticent 
Asian attitudes towards greater regional cooperation," the desired outcome was unlikely.  
Hence, "the selective country-by-country, project-by-project approach holds the greatest 
hope of advancing the regional concept at this time."  Furthermore, rather than 
implementing measures for "the entire Asian area as a single unit," the DOS considered it 
112 Document CK3100178938, DOS comments on the report of the Committee on Asian Economic 
Development and Cooperation, DOS, 27 November 1957, p.5, DDRS. 
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"more practical" to work with "small geographic units (such as the Thailand-Cambodia-Laos-
Viet Nam-Malaya complex) and specific country units…to promot[e] greater regional 
cooperation between and among neighboring countries."113
 
  Thus, projects were 
subsequently undertaken in Southeast Asia on a bilateral or area basis to develop natural 
resource industries, finance, education etc. 
Ultimately, in the second half of the 1950s, Washington could do little to overcome 
the perceived "Asian disinterest in greater regional cooperation."  Thus, US officials could 
only hope that "the Asian attitude may swing in favor of increasing cooperation including the 
establishment of new institutions for specific purposes [economic and developmental] 
(emphasis added)."  Additionally, while believing that "a sound economic base exists for 
increased economic relations between Japan and other [Asian]…countries," Washington had 
to tread carefully to "avoid giving any implication that it was acting as an agent for Japan or 
particularly promoting Japan's interests" because of the animosity stemming from the 
Japanese Occupation.114  Clearly, without the Southeast Asian states working in tandem, it 
was unsurprising that the US failed to make much headway in regionalism to further their 
interests.  Therefore, it was up to Southeast Asians themselves to further regionalism and it 
would be on their terms to serve their interests.  No further progress was made until 1959 
when Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya, proposed the South-East Asia 
Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) to "[put] South-East Asia 'in order'."115
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New and old trends, development, race, imperialism, decolonization and the Cold War, 
created challenges for American efforts to promote regional cooperation and integration in 
Southeast Asia.  The changes in the Cold War conflict led US policymakers to believe that a 
strategic shift was necessary to mount an effective defence against Communism in 
Southeast Asia.  Thus, they favoured political, social and economic regional cooperation to 
develop the decolonizing areas in order to persuade the emerging nation-states that their 
interests were best pursued in alignment with America's.  Although the change in US policy 
was a response to immediate circumstances, it was also a reversion to the 1949 emphasis on 
multilateralism and economic and technical cooperation.  However, the US inexperience in 
such collaboration hindered its foreign policy transition from bilateralism to multilateralism.  
Moreover, the decolonizing states remained suspicious of any perceived attempts to 
subjugate their hard-won independence by both the West and larger Asian countries such as 
India and Japan, contributing to the lack of success of the Bandung Conference, SEATO and 
the Colombo Plan.  Fundamentally, regional cooperation was stalled because Asian countries 
were uninterested in, even cautious of, multilateralism for fear that it would result in a 
reduced amount of bilateral US aid, a smaller share of regional aid funds or both.  This 
impasse was broken in 1959 as the states began experimenting with regional cooperation in 








From 1959, Southeast Asian states explored various forms of regional cooperation.  The 
journey, however, was plagued with all manner of bilateral disputes and antagonisms.  The 
major impediment to furthering regional unity during this period was the formation of 
Malaysia in September 1963.  This event stalled any progress for greater unity and 
cooperation among Southeast Asian states until the winding down of Konfrontasi in 1965.  
Thus, the goal of this chapter is to tell the story of these indigenous regional efforts, the 
prospects for unity and the problems that marred the way and the lessons learnt.  The US 
played an indirect and diminishing role in this process as Southeast Asian regional 
cooperation was partly a reaction to US-led organizations and a means to cope with the 
perceived inadequacies of American promises of aid and security to the nation-states in the 
area.  But Washington continued to use regionalism and development to further its 
interests.  It is therefore necessary to explore US foreign policy under the various 
Washington administrations in order to assess the relative importance of American actions 
in this Southeast Asian story.  Fundamentally, it was extremely difficult to foster unity 
among Southeast Asian states because of the apparent insurmountable differences between 
them which was the legacy of decolonization, nationalism and the Cold War.  But the period 
from 1959-65 saw agency for regionalism pass to Southeast Asians. 
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1958-60: Limitations in American Aid, SEATO and the Creation of SEAFET 
By the time Malayan Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman announced the South-East Asia 
Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) in 1959, several Southeast Asian nation-states 
were already considering alternatives to existing regional institutions.  This derived from 
their dissatisfaction with the scope and goals of SEATO, the Colombo Plan, other loans and 
assistance programs from the US as well as non-US associations such as Bandung.  
Throughout these initiatives, British and American officials refrained from showing too much 
interest or kept their involvement discreet even though these developments were in line 
with their desire to bring regional stability to Southeast Asia.  It was vital that "any 
appearance of Western domination…be avoided."116
 
  Even so, the British paid much more 
attention, because of historical reasons, to these regional developments than the 
Americans. 
The US indeed had a stake in the region but possessed limited means to adequately 
meet the expectations of the West-leaning nation-states in Southeast Asia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Malaya. 
 
The Philippines 
In the late 1950s, Washington was confronted with a wave of Filipino nationalism 
that resented the continued dependence of the Philippines on the US and desired greater 
parity between the two countries in Southeast Asian affairs.  Base rights and criminal 
jurisdiction were a sore point in US-Philippine relations.  Another major source of 
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dissatisfaction was Washington's inability to provide greater economic and technical 
assistance to the Philippines.  Over the course of 1957 and 1958, Philippine presidents 
Ramon Magsaysay and Carlos Garcia made official visits to the US where they requested 
increased funding from Washington for national development.  But, the promises and 
assurances they received were disappointing. 
 
By this time, the US had several economic and technical assistance instruments, 
such as the Development Loan Fund (DLF), Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) etc, through which they could finance loans and 
other programs for development.  Washington also expected Southeast Asian states to 
request more aid.  They judged that Garcia had the "apparent belief that the United States 
must come to his rescue financially" and that he might, "in an effort to obtain U.S. assistance 
in the amounts desired…adopt more nationalistic attitudes or reopen the matter of U.S. 
base rights."117  From 1951-57, Washington provided the Philippines an estimated $251 
million in assistance or credit, excluding military expenditure.118
 
  Yet, this was insufficient. 
During his official visit to the US in June 1958, Garcia stated that the main purpose of 
the trip was "to ask the United States Government for development loans to carry out a 
program of industrialization in the Philippines and to diversify the present agricultural 
economy."  This amounted to $229 million over a three-year period.119
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  However, 
Washington could not promise Garcia funding to his satisfaction for the DLF's $300 million 
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was "far over-subscribed in applications…[amounting] to $1.5 billion" and further 
appropriations waited on Congressional approval.120  Despite the "United States awareness 
of a special relationship to the Philippines," there were "many claimants for the funds 
Congress gives us [US government] and that the strain of the Cold War in many parts of the 
world forces us to spend money in areas not of our own choosing."121  What Washington 
could offer was $75 million in EXIM Bank credits, $50 million from the DLF contingent on 
Congressional approval and $25 million on a gold claim.  US officials estimated that these 
amounts should "[meet] their purposes which Garcia admits but he wants to be able to 
mention 200 million even though they don’t spend it."  Essentially, it was impossible to 
promise funding which Congress had not authorized.122  Garcia did not receive the funding 
for national projects in the way he desired and paid a price in domestic politics in the 
Philippines.  Military aid met a similar fate.  Hence, in early 1959, US-Philippine relations 
entered a post-war low.  Washington thought that these disappointments resulted in Garcia 
adopting a more nationalistic foreign policy aimed at achieving "respectable independence" 
in bilateral relations with the US.123
 
 
In this context, Philippine leaders seemed compelled to push for greater cooperation 
in Southeast Asia for development in the region to meet their economic and security needs 
and assuage national dignity.  Immediately after his return from a state visit to Japan in 
December 1958, Garcia in a speech to the Overseas Press Club spoke of the need for 
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"collective Asian defence against Communist economic and political aggression."124  British 
officials considered this "a starting point of serious Philippine effort to draw closer to her 
Asian neighbours."  In establishing "closer links…between the countries of the area outside 
the great power blocs," Garcia's intentions could be more "political rather than economic 
and cultural."125  London judged that the Philippines desired to seem less dependent on US 
support, especially since US-Philippine relations did not result in the desired international 
prestige or uplift the economic lot of the country.  Furthermore, to Southeast Asians, the 
limitations of SEATO in organizing the defence of the region were increasingly clear.  A new 
regional body to complement SEATO was clearly desirable.126  This, however, did not mean a 
break in US-Philippine relations as both countries were aligned as far as defence and anti-
Communism were concerned.  Precipitating regional developments, thereby enhancing the 
status of the Philippines in Southeast Asia, was also a means to satisfy nationalism.  
American officials discerned that "Filipinos generally aspire to increased international 
recognition, especially among nations of Asia."127
 
  The new regional emphasis can also be 
interpreted as the Philippine desire to leadership in Southeast Asian affairs. 
Thailand 
Economic development and funding from the US became the main focus in US-Thai relations 
by 1958.  The Thai government considered aid from the US to serve both political and 
development purposes.  It was a means to maintain friendly US-Thai relations as well as 
bolster the support of Thai leaders in domestic politics and buttress their efforts to suppress 
the Communist insurgency in the north-eastern part of the country.  Thai leaders made an 
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official visit to Washington from May-June 1958.  During this period, the Thai ambassador to 
the US, Thanat Khoman, called on Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to discuss a 
memo, "Development Projects in Thailand, and then "clarify why additional assistance was 
requested at this time."  Thanat "stressed the importance…for additional aid to Northeast 
Thailand, noting that the justification was more political than economic" in that it was 
necessary to counter the Communist subversion there.  Thus, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, 
the de facto leader of Thailand after the September 1957 military coup, was "authorized by 
the Thai Government to negotiate in Washington for increased grant aid."128
 
 
 It was, again, difficult for the US to promise assistance because of lack of 
Congressional approval for further funding.  So, American officials were up front about their 
limitations in meeting Thai expectations.  At the same time, they believed that the success of 
Thai aid negotiations in Washington was being exploited for personal aggrandizement on the 
part of Thai leaders.  Robertson thought that "the Thai ambassador…may have had the 
impression that the Sarit visit could be used as a mechanism for obtaining additional U.S. 
aid, and that his prestige has unfortunately become associated with success in achieving this 
end.  Now that additional aid is not being obtained, the Thai Ambassador feels somewhat 
bitter."  He therefore requested the US ambassador to Thailand, U. Alexis Johnson, to give 
"some indication of the political reaction in Thailand to the results of Sarit’s talks."  
Washington "wonder[ed] if [Sarit would] suffer a loss of prestige in the absence of any 
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Washington guessed correctly.  Sarit asked for a "gesture" in providing assistance for 
some infrastructural projects as an "indicat[ion] [of] a willingness to help Thailand, [that] 
would enhance the prestige of the present Thai Government."130  After the second military 
coup of the Thai government led by Sarit in October 1958, Thanat "repeated several times 
[to US officials] that Thailand’s success in remaining free and strong depended very largely 
on continuing cooperation in all fields with the United States."131  Again, the link between US 
assistance and Thai domestic politics was made when Thanat mentioned that "Sarit would 
appreciate very much 'if US could make some gesture of support for government to be 
formed.'"132  Washington later responded by sending a letter to the Sarit outlining the 
assistance that would be provided.133
 
 
 This, however, did not satisfy Thai expectations.  There was a real need for domestic 
development.  But Thai leaders continued to leverage aid in US-Thai relations and to 
measure the degree of closeness with the US.  Washington noted that in an April 1959 New 
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York Times interview, Deputy Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn stated that "many 
neighboring countries seemed to receive much more aid from us [the US] than did Thailand 
even though these neighboring countries are less close [to the] US than Thailand."134
 
  Like 
the Philippines, Thailand expected preferential treatment in economic, technical and military 
assistance in return for their staunch pro-Americanism. 
Thai thinking on SEATO reflected these concerns.  Pote Sarasin, the Secretary 
General of SEATO at that time, called on Robertson on 23 January 1959 and "remarked that 
he would appreciate the benefit of our [US] thinking regarding SEATO economic activities."  
Even though Pote "was not advocating that SEATO should attempt large economic projects," 
more should be done so that "somehow the region must progress toward greater economic 
cooperation."  Echoing Thanom's views on Thailand receiving less than it deserved, Pote 
pointed out that "the Pakistanis go too far in demanding substantial additional amounts of 
economic aid because of their SEATO membership."135
 
  Thai leaders clearly thought that 
they were being sold short and therefore used SEATO to underscore issues in bilateral 
relations with the US.  Pote's comments also revealed that the Thais hoped that existing 
regional institutions could be expanded to be more developmental, hence "he would like the 
U.S. to give serious thought to the future of SEATO." 
However, American thinking on developmentalism and multilateralism remained 
inflexible.  Robertson maintained that "SEATO is primarily a defense organization.  It would, 
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therefore, be wrong to attempt to change the organization into something else."  Economic 
assistance mechanisms would be kept separate from SEATO as "there was just so much 
money available in the United States for aid purposes."  Although membership in SEATO did 
factor in US aid distribution, Robertson declared that "it is not possible to have a double 
program."136
 
  Therefore, it seems that aid was to be conducted at a bilateral level and as a 
supplement to the maintenance of existing political and security links between US and 
Southeast Asian states. 
It is evident that by the end of the second Eisenhower administration, the US was 
both unable and unwilling to make any progress in evolving SEATO to serve their vision of 
containing Communist expansion.  Their means were fundamentally limited.  While it is 
understandable that SEATO served a specific, military purpose, and was therefore unsuitable 
to be adapted to other functions, Washington's perspective on regionalism in Southeast Asia 
also contributed to the stalemate.  After the Simla Conference, US officials thought that "the 
situation in Southeast Asia was not yet ripe for placing economic aid on a regional basis.  The 
SEA countries wanted to hang on to bilateral aid, but at the same time they hoped to get 
additional assistance from any possible regional aid organs."137
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  It also seems that the 
Americans had the idea that bilateral distribution of aid precluded a multilateral one.  This 
perhaps reveals their inexperience in managing both bilateral and multilateral relations.  
Interestingly because the US could not furnish sufficient aid that pushed Southeast Asian 
nations to explore regional cooperation from 1959 with a strong focus on development.  
Southeast Asian leaders likely perceived multilateralism as a tool to wrangle the desired 
assistance from the US.   Therefore, the US inability to respond adequately to the needs of 
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island Southeast Asia resulted, ironically, in initiative for regionalism springing from that 
area. 
 
Malaya, SEATO and SEAFET 
Like the Philippines and Thailand, Malaya sought US funding for developmental and counter-
insurgency purposes over the course of 1958 and encountered the same response from 
Washington.  But, Malaya was concerned with projecting a non-aligned image in 
international affairs as a statement of independence and sovereignty.  This was necessary as 
domestic opposition to the ruling party favoured neutralism in foreign policy.  Malaya, 
nonetheless, leaned towards the Western powers.  At the same time, its leaders, like other 
Southeast Asian ones, sought to establish themselves as regional or international statesmen. 
 
After the February 1958 Colombo Consultative Committee Meeting held in Seattle, 
the Tunku held a press conference in Kuala Lumpur in which he urged greater cooperation 
between the smaller Southeast Asian countries as they were "too much inclined to dance to 
the tune of bigger nations."  While this followed the familiar tune of decolonization and 
independence, the Tunku also expressed a preference for a non-Bandung and non-leftist 
mode of regional cooperation.  Southeast Asian states "should not concern themselves 
unduly with the world and Afro-Asian politics when they had problems of their own nearer 
at hand.  An effort should be made to build up their own unity and understanding" lest 
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 The Tunku's ideas on the premises of a new regional grouping were further 
elaborated in a talk with Geofroy Tory, the British High Commissioner, on 12 February 1958.  
On the possible bases of unity among Southeast Asian states, Tory reported that the Tunku 
"had no particular steps clearly in mind, but evidently thought, vaguely, that over a period of 
time closer association might develop."  Nonetheless, a few key themes emerged in the 
discussion.  The imperative at that point seemed to be "the need to deal with Communist 
subversion."  Referring to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, the Tunku was reportedly 
"attracted by the idea that these other countries in South-East Asia…were monarchies like 
Malaya" and that "he may have meant that they were all torn to some extent between the 
forces of socialism and neutrality on the one hand and their own inherent conservatism and 
links with the West on the other."  The need for Southeast Asians "[to improve] their own 
domestic lot" was also constantly emphasized.139
 
  Clearly, Tunku Abdul Rahman thought the 
likely impetus for Southeast Asian unity was the historic societal similarities between Malaya 
and these countries, their experience of colonialism, the struggle by right-wing nationalists 
against Communist, or leftist, ones and the economic development of their countries. 
This effort towards greater Southeast Asian cooperation was sustained in dialogues 
that resulted in SEAFET.  In January 1959, Tunku Abdul Rahman made an official visit to the 
Philippines as part of an attempt "to get countries in this area together by closer contact."140  
The Philippine Foreign Secretary, Felixberto Serrano, reportedly mentioned that "the idea of 
a cultural and economic alliance of South-East Asian nations" was a probable agenda item of 
the visit.141
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  Countering Communist expansion by economic stability was a major focus of the 
talks with Philippine President Carlos Garcia.  The Tunku said, "We can keep Communist 
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elements out if we have a better standard of living and economic stability.  We must help 
one another…by pooling our resources."142  Yet, he refrained from proposing an anti-
Communist pact for it "would divide countries in South-East Asia because many of them 
were neutral."143  Nonetheless, anti-Communism ranked high among the concerns of 
Malayan and Philippine leaders.  The Straits Times reported that, "Tengku Abdul 
Rahman…expressed the opinion that with their affinity of race and common interests, 
Malaya and the Philippines could wipe out the Communist menace in South-East Asia."144  
The Tunku said, "Both of us [Malaya and the Philippines] know from bitter experience what 
the Communist threat really means.  We are determined to stand against this brutal 
ideological onslaught on our ways of life."145
 
  Therefore SEAFET, while championing 
economic and cultural cooperation, slanted towards anti-Communism. 
SEAFET can be considered a disappointment to US hopes of strengthening SEATO as 
the representative organization of the interests of Southeast Asian nation-states.  American 
officials hoped to "discreetly encourage Malaya's participation and membership in SEATO, 
avoiding any actions which might strengthen neutralist sentiment."146
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  Nevertheless, 
Malaya's agreement with SEATO's anti-Communist stance did not translate into its embrace 
of the institution.  When Serrano visited Kuala Lumpur before the 1959 SEATO conference in 
Wellington, he suggested that developing SEATO on the economic side would enable it to 
attract new members.  The implication of this was that SEAFET could be an associated 
organization to SEATO.  This possibility was quickly rejected by the Malayan Deputy Prime 
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Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, who denied that Malaya would join SEATO.147  Therefore, the US 
goal of bringing Malaya into SEATO seemed unattainable.  SEAFET was evidence of the 
Tunku's "dislike for regional associations such as SEATO, which [had] a political and military 
content as well as big power participation."148
 
  What Malaya sought was a means to express 
and protect a Southeast Asian position in the Cold War.  Once again, SEATO's credibility as a 
Southeast Asian regional organization was called into question as Malaya distanced itself. 
According to Tarling, the SEAFET communiqué expressed "racial kinship" between 
signatories as a basis for cooperation.149  This potentially narrowed the scope of SEAFET to 
island Southeast Asia which comprised Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines and Singapore.  
With the exception of Singapore, the other countries are dominated by peoples of common 
ethnological descent with cultural similarities.  While Garcia and the Tunku seemingly did 
not give much emphasis to this form of regional unity in their public statements at that time, 
it certainly existed in the popular imagination.  During the Tunku's visit, a Philippine jurist 
and historian, Jorgo Bocobo, suggested "a confederation of Malay states composed of the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya."150
The peoples of these countries…originated from the same 
racial stock and only the foreign colonizers divided them 
into what are known today as Filipinos, Malays and 
Indonesians….Now that the black clouds of colonialism have 
been dispelled the star of the Malay race rises brilliantly 
again beckoning all Malays to unite for the glory of the 
Malay race.
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But such a sub-regional association based on racial ties faced the daunting obstacle of 
nationalism and intra-regional rivalry.  Already in 1959, the Garcia and Tunku joint 
communiqué was snubbed by Indonesia.  Priding itself as a fiercely independent country 
prominent in the Afro-Asian bloc and a founding member of the Bandung Conference, 
Indonesia naturally found much to protest in SEAFET.  An Australian observer summed up 
the Indonesian sentiment: "he [the Tunku] has been showing too much initiative and 
independence for the liking of a people who promoted and staged the Bandung Conference 
and who expected to have the new independent Malaya in their pocket."152
 
  Political rivalry 
thus hindered unity based on racial or ethnic ties. 
 Without the participation of the neutralist-leaning nation-states in the region, 
SEAFET could not be effectively distinguished from SEATO because the parties driving the 
project were West-leaning.  It therefore aroused the suspicions of the neutrals that SEAFET 
was another means by the Great Powers to control the region.  Because of this, it was 
necessary to redefine SEAFET on terms acceptable to these states.  In April 1959, Philippine 
and Malayan leaders announced their interest to include mainland Southeast Asian states 
such as Thailand, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma in SEAFET.153
 
  Not only would 
this dampen nationalist tensions among Southeast Asian states, it would promote the 
international standing of the leaders who precipitated a positive outcome.  With this in 
mind, it is unsurprising that Thai interest in SEAFET also grew.  Therefore throughout 1959, 
Thailand began contributing to discussions to resolve the issues inhibiting regional unity. 
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 The South East Asia Community Organization (SEACOR) was a Thai attempt to close 
the gap between the political orientations of Southeast Asian states.  In July 1959, the Thais 
sent the proposal for SEACOR to all capitals in the region except Hanoi.  Following that in 
October 1959, the Tunku sent letters to the same capitals soliciting the comments of 
Southeast Asian leaders on SEAFET and suggesting a conference in Kuala Lumpur in early 
1960 to discuss SEACOR.154  SEACOR was intended to be primarily economic, but with space 
to discuss and resolve all problems affecting the region or its members, including divisive 
political ones.  To the Thais, any regional association would be "meaningless unless there is 
some political purpose."  But, this view met with resistance from the Philippines and Malaya 
who thought that "neutral opinion would immediately be frightened off" by this agenda.155
 
 
Negotiations continued but by March 1960, "Indonesia had formally rejected the 
idea [SEAFET]."  Despite attempts by Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand to include 
Indonesia, Sukarno resisted participating in the direction charted by the pro-West Southeast 
Asian states.  Instead he insisted that Southeast Asian regional unity be built in the Afro-
Asian context.  Moreover, SEAFET and SEACOR failed to appeal to other neutralist Southeast 
Asian states even though they were interested in regional cooperation.156
 
  The sharp 
divisions in the political leanings of Southeast Asian countries and the lack of success in 
building bridges between them meant that SEAFET and SEACOR could not take off as viable 
regional organizations.  This setback did not deter Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand from 
pursuing an inclusive regionalism for Southeast Asia.  The next breakthrough would come in 
1961 with the formation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). 
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1961-65: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Aid, ASA and Maphilindo 
At the same time, the US underwent a political transition with the election of President John 
F. Kennedy who seemed to herald a new era in US foreign relations.  In his inaugural 
address, Kennedy declared that the US would pursue a more activist foreign policy in which 
they would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose 
any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."157    Seizing the moral high ground, 
"to those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of 
mass misery," Kennedy "pledge[d] our [America] best efforts to help them help themselves, 
for whatever period is required—not because the communists may be doing it, not because 
[the US sought] their votes, but because it is right."158  Rhetoric aside, Gaddis argues that, 
"Democrats had generally been more tolerant of expensive domestic and national security 
programs than had more fiscally cautious Republicans."159  Indeed, under the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations, there was an expansion of Eisenhower-era policies concerning 
multilateralism and development.  It stemmed from a philosophical change in the conduct of 
foreign policy.  Additionally, it was only during the Kennedy years that the administrative 
frameworks and academic input necessary for the increased US developmental role were 
implemented.  The new direction was, however, neither an act of charity nor a blank cheque 
for American assistance programs.  Kennedy also qualified that the US would not act alone, 
that it could not defend those who were incapable of defending themselves and that it 
would not unnecessarily risk nuclear war to achieve its ends.160
 
  Regardless, Kennedy's 
address raised hopes and expectations of an increased US humanitarian role internationally. 
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"The New Look" 
Development-minded officials in Washington, such as Walt Rostow, tackled the 
inadequacies of US aid disbursement as a first step towards Kennedy's ambitious vision of 
the international role of the US.  "The New Look" in foreign aid aimed to be: 
A coordinated Free World effort with enough resources to 
move forward those nations prepared to mobilize their own 
resources for development purposes. The goal is to help 
other countries learn how to grow. Aid ends when self-
sustained growth is achieved and borrowing can proceed in 
normal commercial ways….This notion can be made an 
effective basis for a new non-colonial approach of the 
Atlantic Community to the southern half of the world; and 
even relatively poor countries, who have passed the take-




While the move from using US assistance as short-term, stop-gap measures, to tackle 
emergencies that threatened American interests began during Eisenhower's term, it was 
only during the Kennedy years that the US government overhauled its aid programs.  This 
meant reconsidering the criteria for aid disbursement, providing long-term financing, 
moving away from a "project approach" to one that "develop[ed] whole nations" and 
actively pursued a multilateral approach with Free World partners to fund assistance 
programs for less-developed countries.  This would provide, over a period of four years, an 
average of $1 billion annually with "an extra Free World margin of about $2 billion a 
year."162
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  In order to administer this massive effort, foreign aid apparatuses was 








After this restructuring, the US conducted its foreign assistance programs via two 
organizations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
USAID.  The OECD is the successor to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
and participated in some development projects in the Third World.  On the part of the US, 
multilateralism and development was conducted through the OECD.  USAID essentially 
functioned on a bilateral basis. 
 
 Because Washington aimed to implement long-term programs, "the emphasis on 
country planning…characteriz[ed] the most recent thinking on foreign aid" and so, "over-all 
U.S. objectives for a particular country [took] priority as a rule over general concepts 
governing the use of…various foreign aid resources."164  Other criteria for aid disbursement 
were the willingness and ability of the recipient government for "self-help" and the 
prospects for helping them to achieve "self-sustaining growth."  US officials categorized 
Third World countries into three groups: countries with "good prospects for achieving self-
sustaining growth;" countries that were "dominated by short-run external or internal 
security problems (such Korea, Vietnam, Laos etc);" and countries in which "US participation 
is limited and secondary (such as the African and some Asian countries)."165
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group of countries, the US aid was "confined to technical assistance" which could be a 
means to merely…establish a US presence…forestall Bloc enterprises [and] in other cases…to 
acquire strategic facilities."166
 
  Therefore, while US foreign assistance became more targeted 
to development, it still retained its traditional political priorities and functions.  Because of 
the entrenched bilateralism in the new aid outlook, regional thinking was less focused on 
establishing regional organizations.  American attention turned to large developmental 
projects in mainland Southeast Asia, such as the proposed hydroelectric power station in the 
Mekong River Basin, planned to be similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority.  Efforts were 
concentrated in a few countries.  Moreover, the concern over the Communist threat in Laos 
and Vietnam increasingly dominated US priorities.  When Kennedy was assassinated in 
November 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded him as President and continued his work.  
But Johnson after re-election in 1964, pursued a grand vision for Southeast Asia that 
incorporated development and multilateralism.  This will be covered in the next chapter.  It 
is pertinent to note that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' use of development to 
stabilize Southeast Asia was a continuation of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' 
policy direction.  Their contribution in the 1960s was the rationalization of diplomatic 
apparatuses required to effect development and multilateralism in the region. 
ASA and Maphilindo 
Amidst the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, 
soldiered on to create an inclusive regional organization that would facilitate the resolution 
of nationalist and ideological conflicts troubling the region, thereby ushering in more 
amenable inter-state relations.  Because of the difficulty in forming a political association of 
Southeast Asian states, SEAFET members explored economic cooperation in greater depth.  




In July 1960, the Tunku announced that SEAFET would henceforth be known as the 
Association of South East Asian States (ASAS), which would explore the prospects for 
regional cooperation in the areas of aviation, shipping, marketing and pricing of primary 
goods and technical and administrative training and research.167  ASAS was a plan drafted by 
Thanat Khoman as an alternative to SEAFET.  Working papers were submitted by Malaya, the 
Philippines and Thailand and the respective foreign ministers met for talks in Kuala Lumpur 
in January 1961.168  Contemporary observers noted that this "explicitly anti-Communist but 
non-military association [was] presumably designed to attract other states of the non-
aligned persuasion into closer cooperation with the three present members."169  The name 
change would also help distance ASAS from SEATO and thus have broader appeal.  Meetings 
between the three states continued into 1961 with further proposals for greater economic, 
educational and cultural cooperation submitted.  However, ASAS was coolly received by the 
neutral states.  Indonesia rejected and criticized further efforts as "the SEATO countries' 
efforts to make a subtle link between SEATO and non-SEATO countries in Asia."170  
Concerning the Indonesian rebuff, the Tunku recounted that Indonesia rejected it as "a tool 
of American imperialism, ignoring the fact that all the work, effort, ideas and goals…had 
sprung entirely from the energies and beliefs of the three countries involved."171
 
  
Nonetheless, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand continued to push regionalism forward. 
The persistence of the three countries resulted in the establishment of the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) with machinery providing for subsequent meetings.  
Building on the ASAS framework, ASA comprised of a joint working party that led to an 
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annual meeting of foreign ministers, a standing committee chaired by the foreign minister of 
the host country, specialist committees and a national secretariat in each country.172  At the 
ASA meeting in April 1962, the Malayan, Philippine and Thai foreign ministers decided on 
several multilateral agreements in communications and travel and agreed to seek approval 
from their respective governments to create an ASA fund for various developmental projects 
to be undertaken.173
 
  That these were agreements on peripheral issues should not obscure 
the real progress made in Southeast Asian regionalism.  ASA saw regional cooperation move 
from discussion to institutionalization.  Furthermore, although many of the agreements had 
yet to be acted upon, the resolve of Southeast Asian states to foster unity in a time of 
conflict was demonstrated.  However, the disputes arising from the formation of Malaysia 
threatened to derail ASA. 
Further progress in ASA was hampered by a bilateral dispute between Malaya and 
the Philippines.  By mid-1962, plans were underway to federate Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore to form Malaysia as a vehicle for the decolonization of British possessions.  This 
met with opposition from the Philippines because of its territorial claims to Sabah.  
Indonesia also decried it as a neo-colonial and neo-imperial plot to preserve British influence 
in the region.  Malayan officials attempted to minimize the potential fracture in ASA, stating 
that "there is no danger that the solidarity of the Association of Southeast Asia will be 
impaired" as a result of the Sabah and Sarawak problem, for "ASA is an economic and 
cultural association.  The Philippines claim is entirely political."174
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scope by adding five and a half million Borneans and Singapore citizens to Malaya's six 
million."175
 
  During the April 1963 ASA meeting in Manila, 170 recommendations were 
approved, signaling that the spat between Malaya and the Philippines had not escalated to 
the point of an irreparable breach.  But ASA was effectively stalled because of the plans to 
form Malaysia.  Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia was thus hindered by the forces of 
decolonization and nationalism. 
The Malaysia problem gave rise to Maphilindo (Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia) and 
it was an important example of the utilization of regionalism in Southeast Asia.  A short-lived 
regional cooperative plan, Maphilindo was birthed out of a series of talks at Manila held in 
mid-1963 between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines.  The talks were "prompted by 
their keen and common desire to have a general exchange of views on current problems 
concerning stability…of the three countries and of the region" because of the conflicts and 
differences that arose from the Malaysia problem.176  Malaya-Philippine relations were 
strained and Indonesia had announced on 20 January 1963 a policy of "confrontation" 
against Malaya.177  When Maphilindo was proposed by Philippine President Diosdado 
Macapagal as a way of addressing the Malaysia problem, it was quickly supported by 
Sukarno.178
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 it was also ostensibly a tool of conflict resolution.  At the same 
time, it was undeniable that Maphilindo was an attempt by Indonesia and the Philippines to 
block Malayan national aspirations.  Hence, regionalism in Southeast Asia had clashing 
objectives—conflict resolution and national aggrandizement. 
 Maphilindo stalled when it failed to prevent the formation of Malaysia on terms 
acceptable to the involved parties.  It contravened a crucial principle articulated at the 
Manila meeting which was that the three states would cooperate "but without surrendering 
any portion of their sovereignty."180  The leaders of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines 
agreed for a UN body to ascertain whether the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak wished to join 
Malaysia.  However, Indonesia and the Philippines were incensed when Tunku Abdul 
Rahman met with the British in London in the same month Maphilindo was announced and 
proclaimed that Malaysia would be established on 16 September, regardless of the UN 
findings.181
 
  An assertion of national will by Malaya thus ran counter to maintaining harmony 
among the three states.  Because of this, the Philippines severed relations with Malaya and 
Indonesia pursued Konfrontasi.  This sounded the death knell for Maphilindo and any 
peaceful, multilateral solution to the Malaysia problem.  The Malaysia-Maphilindo saga, like 
ASA, demonstrates the importance of national sovereignty in Southeast Asia and how it 
could fracture regional unity.  In order for any regional association to be successful, it had to 
respect Southeast Asian states' need to preserve national sovereignty.  Therefore, nothing 
else could be done until 1965 when this obstacle to regionalism was neutralized. 
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From 1959-65, the countries in island Southeast Asia experimented with various means to 
cooperate.  Their projects arose from dissatisfaction with existing regional institutions and 
US promises of developmental assistance.  This led to Malayan, Philippine and Thai 
involvement in SEAFET.  However, because of their alignment with the US in the Cold War, 
their proposals failed to win acceptance by the neutralist states in the region.  Indonesia, the 
most vocal of these states, consistently snubbed and criticized SEAFET, ASAS and ASA.  
Sukarno demanded his way and resisted invitations to participate in the initiatives of other 
Southeast Asian leaders.  Furthermore, as seen in the issues arising from the formation of 
Malaysia, bilateral disagreements and nationalism proved to be obstacles to greater regional 
unity.  Yet, the various initiatives also demonstrate the resolve and creativity of Malaya, the 
Philippines and Thailand in pushing for regional cooperation.  Creating a regional 
organization was clearly a desirable enterprise and one which taught Southeast Asians much 
about how multilateralism could be used to address both bilateral and regional problems.  
These lessons were invaluable to the formation of ASEAN in 1967.  Significantly, these 
developments in regionalism paralleled the Truman administration's post-war vision for 
peninsular Southeast Asia.  It is therefore ironic that Washington's reluctance to increase aid 




Realizing Regionalism Dreams, 1965-67 
 
Introduction 
1965-67 saw pivotal change in US foreign policy interest towards regionalism in Southeast 
Asia as the new Johnson administration unveiled plans to institutionalize multilateral 
development in the region.  This eventually resulted in the establishment of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), which can be seen as the fulfillment of one of the original 
intentions of regionalism in US foreign policy, to bring about development in Asia.   In the 
same period, Southeast Asia also experienced political shifts because of the separation of 
Singapore from Malaysia and the overthrow of the Sukarno regime in Indonesia.  Plans to 
create a Southeast Asian regional organization were then restarted and, after two years, 
ASEAN was formalized as the institution that represented Southeast Asian interests globally 
by giving an international voice to the region.  It is noteworthy that both the ADB and ASEAN 
have outlasted the preoccupations of the 1960s and the Cold War, suggesting that they 
encompass the historical and contemporary modes of interaction among the involved 
countries as well.  This chapter details the efforts to build the ADB and ASEAN and highlights 




LBJ's "Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia"182
Johnson's approach to combating Communism by means of development was already 
articulated while he was Vice President during the Kennedy years after a trip to Southeast 
Asia in May 1961.  In his report to President Kennedy, Johnson's "basic convictions about the 




SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer 
because of British and French unwillingness to support 
decisive action.  Asian distrust of the British and French is 
outspoken…we must be ready with a new approach to 
collective security in the area.  We should consider an 
alliance of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia who 
are willing to join forces in defense of their freedom.  Such 
an organization should have a clear-cut command authority 
[and] also devote attention to measures and programs of 
social justice, housing, land reform, etc….In large measure, 
the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the 
United States is not the momentary threat of Communism 
itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, 
poverty and disease.  We must…keep these enemies the 
point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our 
scientific and technological capacity in such enterprises.




Johnson envisioned a formal regional organization that was focused on development in 
Southeast Asia and comprising membership of countries that tilted towards the US.  Tackling 
the challenges of nation-building in the region would enable the US to gain the desired 
security from Communism.  Thus when Johnson assumed the presidency in 1965, 
Washington was abuzz with activity to realize this vision. 
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By March 1965, a Southeast Asia Development Association had been proposed by 
policymakers in Washington.  In order to attain maximum support and acceptability for this 
initiative, US officials sought the endorsement of the UN and ECAFE.  Its membership would 
comprise Southeast Asian countries, including Communist ones, and "certain ECAFE 
countries" outside the region.  This organization would also "coordinate its planning with 
ECAFE for such ongoing regional programs as the Mekong River projects and the ECAFE 
highway."  With this, the US seemed to move towards an unprecedented level of 
multilateral cooperation in development.  Fundamentally, the organization "must not be 
regarded or treated as a creature or special client of the U.S."  Therefore, "to the maximum 




To do this, Washington suggested that the UN Secretary General, U Thant, "be 
approached in confidence and at a high level with the object of having him advance the plan 
as his own idea."  Next, he "should be encouraged to appoint a committee of 'Asian Wise 
Men (economists and other experts from Thailand, Philippines and Japan),'" to put forward 
concrete proposals for the new organization.  More political groundwork was required.  
Thus, it was recommended that "U Thant's initiative should be followed at once by a 
Presidential statement endorsing U Thant's proposal as an appropriate follow-up to 'Point 5 
(Johnson's statement to the Cabinet on Vietnam and potential Southeast Asian development 
on 25 March).'  The congressional leadership should be briefed at this juncture in order to 
assure Hill support."186
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"the formation of an Asian Regional Bank could be expedited and the proposal could be 
submitted to it, or [the US] could proceed on a bilateral basis."187  On 5 April, US 
representatives to the UN met with U Thant to discuss the Southeast Asian Development 
Association.  Although U Thant "spoke with genuine warmth" about it, he had reservations.  
This was seemingly because he was unsure of the prospect of North Vietnam's involvement 
with the Southeast Asian Development Association.188
 
  At this point, it seemed that the likely 
result of the talks would be the formation of a regional bank or the establishment of a 
bilateral framework. 
 Undeterred, Johnson announced his expansive vision of peace through development 
in a speech at Johns Hopkins University on 7 April 1965.  Commenting extensively on the 
Vietnam conflict, Johnson concluded that the key to peace in the region was for Southeast 
Asian countries to "associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for 
development" in which "North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as 
soon as peaceful cooperation is possible."  He asserted that "the people of North Viet-
Nam…want what their neighbors also desire: food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a 
chance to learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage of material misery.  
And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than 
in the endless course of battle."189
                                                            
187 Ibid. 
  Johnson also appealed to the UN Secretary General to 
"use the prestige of his great office, and his deep knowledge of Asia, to initiate, as soon as 
possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development," 
and to Congress to "join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is 
188 Document 59, "Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State," 5 
April 1965, FRUS 1964-68, Vol.27, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-
68v27/d59>, June 2012. 
189 Lyndon B. Johnson, "Address at Johns Hopkins University: "Peace Without Conquest."," 7 April 
1965.  Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26877>, June 2012. 
86 
 
underway."190  Therefore, peace on the battlefield was to be achieved by bringing North 
Vietnam into a coordinated effort to develop Southeast Asia.  Humanity would then "prevail 
over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind."191
 
 
To realize his dream, Johnson created "a special team of outstanding, patriotic, 
distinguished Americans…headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the 
World Bank."192  Describing himself as an "international civil servant," Black's close 
relationship to Johnson only began in April 1965.193  He was apparently "shanghaied" into 
the job of Special Adviser to the President on Southeast Asia.  Black only discovered 
Johnson's appointing him in the Johns Hopkins speech when McGeorge Bundy, the 
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, broke the news to him a few days 
before.194  On 9 April, Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 329 
establishing the Task Force on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development which was 
charged to "prepare plans and recommendations for [him and Black] with respect to the 
positions the United States should take for the support of the broad policy announced."195
 
 
As a development banker as well as an American policymaker, Eugene Black's 
position was unique.  His years as President of the World Bank resulted in him being "a 
partisan of multilateral and regional organizations" because of their effectiveness in bringing 
development and because it was "possible in such organizations to insulate the business of 
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development finance somewhat from competing and conflicting interests that beset all 
national governments."196  Regional developmental institutions therefore created space for 
greater understanding and cooperation, to result between participating countries which 
could be enemies, for example, India and Pakistan, eventual members of the ADB.  Like 
Johnson, Black believed that "a world dedicated to development is…a necessary prerequisite 
to a world at peace or a world in which law has some real force."197
 
  Thus, he strongly 
supported the ADB as a tool for regional cooperation. 
As an American official, Black also understood the diplomatic potential for the US in 
development.  In his mind, "the major continuing means open to [the US] to influence the 
course of regional cooperation is…development assistance."  This would enable the US to 
circumvent the possibility that Japan could not be a reliable military and political partner in 
Southeast Asia and the daunting barriers to fostering cooperation among Southeast Asian 
nation-states.198  Writing during a time when the US was struggling to reconcile its global 
military involvement with the pressure to disengage, Black thought that development was a 
promising diplomatic tool for the Americans to "rekindle confidence among [their] friends" 
as well as bring greater parity in US bilateral relations with Asian countries.199  American 
power and influence channelled into development would "[broaden] and [deepen] that one 
area of international cooperation which offers the best hope for gaining acceptance among 
the many diverse nations of the world community."200
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 Upon his appointment, Black immediately met with U Thant and C.V. Narasimhan, 
then the UN Chef de Cabinet, on 13 April to discuss how the US could move forward with 
Johnson's billion-dollar plan.  They suggested that the US join and support the Asian Bank, a 
proposal discussed and recommended by ECAFE for some time but one which had received 
"lukewarm" treatment from the US.201  Another interest was for the US to support the Nam 
Gum dam project in Laos.202  Black recollected that he "personally [had] never been 
particularly favorable to regional banks."  But because both UN officials "felt that this was 
tremendously important, that these countries of Southeast Asia were very anxious to have 
[it], and this was a wonderful example of cooperation between these countries," 
Washington, "after various discussions," decided to support the Asian Bank.203
 
 
Development Finance: Creating the Asian Development Bank 
Black played an instrumental role in the founding of the ADB for his term as president of the 
World Bank enabled him to help implement the charter, bylaws and constitution.204  This 
bank would "alleviate poverty and help create a world in which everyone can share in the 
benefits of sustained and inclusive growth" by "targeting…investments wisely."  This would 
be mainly accomplished by loans, grants, policy dialogue, technical assistance and equity 
investments.205
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  Its proposed capitalization fund was $1 billion which would be raised by 
countries in both US and Soviet blocs.  However, only Asians could apply for ADB assistance.  
Thus, it was a multilateral organization intended only for Asian use.  This was exactly what 
the Americans sought in their proposed Southeast Asia Development Association except that 
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it was realized in the form of an Asian regional bank.  Evidently, there was a large degree of 
convergence in US and Third World interest concerning development.  Fundamentally, the 
Johnson administration's commitment to multilateralism and development enabled the US 
to cooperate with the UN and Asians.  Because of this willingness not to demand their way, 
the Americans achieved great progress in moving regionalism in a direction that served their 
interests. 
 
Besides the ECAFE interest in an Asian regional bank, Japan had been strong 
supporter of the idea since 1962 as a means to further economic ties and development 
Southeast Asia.  But, until 1965, Washington's indifference prevented any progress.  It was 
only during the Johnson administration that the US approached development multilaterally.  
Furthermore because of the legacy of the Second World War, Japan could not be too 
assertive in the region.206
The Sato Administration is re-examining Japan's policies 
toward Southeast Asia with the aim…of making greater 
efforts in this area beyond mere commercial transactions 
and including the development of economic and cultural ties 
with political overtones between SEA nations and Japan.  
Both [Foreign Minister] Shiina and Prime Minister Sato have 
publicly affirmed the Government's intention to do more in 
Southeast Asia.
  Nonetheless, this interest was sustained.  In of January 1965, 




This did not mean greater Japanese military involvement in Southeast Asia as domestic 
opinion held "serious misgivings" over the successful prosecution of US foreign policy in the 
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region for fear of the "long-term risk to Japan in over-commitment to the U.S. position."208  
Japan had strong trade interests in the region.  Therefore, "to protect this interest and to 
serve the twin objectives of strengthening the U.S.-Japan partnership and increasing Japan's 
influence in world affairs, Sato intend[ed] to expand Japan's non-military aid to Southeast 
Asia."209  Johnson's billion-dollar peace through development proposal provided an 
opportunity for the Japanese to achieve this end.  Hence, Sato announced that Japan was 
"fully prepared to extend further cooperation to the best of her ability" and committed to 
the ADB.210  Indeed, the ADB seems to have greatly served Japan's economic interests 
because 78.48 percent of the total ADB loans from 1968 to 1972 eventually went to 
countries with which Japan had important trading ties, such as Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, South Korea and the Philippines.211
 
 
The ADB garnered sufficient international support by mid-1965.  Thus from 28-29 
June, the ECAFE met to discuss its formation in Bangkok.  Discussions went well and Japan 
sought to host the bank headquarters.212
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  Negotiations continued and by the next ECAFE 
meeting in Bangkok in November 1965, $900 million was raised for the ADB.  This amount 
was $100 million less of the proposed $1 billion capitalization fund because of the "shortfall 
in European support."  Despite this "disappointment," US officials reported that the 
enthusiasm of the Asian nations enabled them to "eagerly [press] forward toward the final 
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signing ceremonies to be held in Manila December 2-3-4."  The shortage in funds could be 
compensated after the establishment of the bank.213
 
 
To solve the problem, Black proposed that the US contribute the last $100 million, 
but this suggestion met with opposition.  Japan and the US each gave $200 million to the 
bank.  If the Americans increased their monetary support, it would be politically 
incompatible with the image of the ADB as an Asian institution.214  Washington tried as 
much as possible to position Japan as the leader, or at least as the preeminent US partner, in 
this Asian enterprise.  But, the choice of ADB headquarters to be situated in the Philippines 
was a political setback for Japan.  The decision to locate the ADB in Manila was deliberate.  
In order for it to accomplish its primary objective of "accelerat[ing] the economic 
development of the developing countries in Asia…the Bank must not only know the 
hardships, problems and dreams of these countries, but must also look at…[them] through 
the eyes of these countries.  The Bank must therefore be located in a developing country."215
 
   
Japan was still the most developed country in Asia and contributed a significant portion of 
the ADB's capitalization funds.  Ultimately, Japan's pre-eminence in the ADB persisted, 
demonstrated by the fact that the bank's president has always been Japanese.  Finally, in 
December 1965, the ADB was established with the signing of the charter documents by 
participating countries.  It legally came into being in August 1966 after the ratification of 
these documents by the member-countries' governments. 
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The Communist world was invited to participate in the ADB and the USSR sent 
officials to the Bangkok talks.216   But, they eventually refrained from joining, protesting that 
the US and Japan together had more votes than other countries.217  This, however, did not 
hinder the formation of the bank.  Furthermore, to emphasize that the ADB was targeted at 
Southeast Asian developmental needs, US officials proposed a special Southeast Asia fund of 
potentially $600 million to be created in the bank with contributions from the US, Japan and 
"all others." This fund was intended to provide grants and soft loans only for Southeast Asian 
developmental projects.218
 
  However, this proposal met with obstacles in Congress even up 
to 1971.  Nonetheless in the early 1970s, this fund was established with unilateral 
contributions by other countries. 
Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech gave further impetus for SEATO's Asian members to 
voice the desire that the organization focus more on development.  At SEATO's inception, 
Article III of the Manila Treaty provided for the fostering of economic cooperation in the 
treaty area.  Washington responded positively to this but only insofar as it did not 
complicate what [the US hoped] to see evolve under ASA, 
ASPAC [Asia and Pacific Council], the Asian Development 
Bank, etc., and further distract SEATO from what should be 
its primary and counter-subversion concerns.  The best 
compromise, and one that considers [US] overall objectives 
in the region, might be to encourage only those SEATO 
development projects that either relate directly to security 
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or can be accomplished better under SEATO than other 
auspices after considering available alternatives.219
The counter-subversion centre has been covered by other scholars.
 
220  Essentially, SEATO 
was to remain a military pact.  Despite Washington's efforts to "[give] some substance to 
SEATO beyond its use to legitimize [the US] effort in Vietnam," it was clear by the mid 1960s 
that SEATO's relevance as a military organization in Southeast Asian affairs was waning.221
 
  
Achieving peace through multilateralism and development took precedence in US foreign 
policy. 
Other Regional Developmental Initiatives 
The ADB was not the only instrument by which Japan and the US sought to attain their 
regional goals.  At the same time discussions were underway to establish the ADB, both 
countries held talks with several Asian countries on the feasibility of smaller regional 
projects in education, transport and communications etc.  All these means could collectively 
realize Johnson's goal of helping Asia develop and bring peace to the region. 
 
At the Japan Joint Economic Committee meeting on 12 July 1965, Japanese Foreign 
Minister Shiina Etsusaburo presented a proposal for an assistance program for Southeast 
Asia that was envisioned to be broader than the Mekong River plan, thereby reaching more 
countries such as Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia and the 
Philippines.  The Japanese saw that the developmental needs of these states were real but 
because of the perceived "inferiority complex," the donor nation issue was a sensitive one 
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for "in Southeast Asia donor nations suffer from the political implications of the Viet-Nam 
problem."  This meant that the Japanese had to choose a "very discreet fashion" to present 
the proposal to the Americans.222
 
 
 The plan was to invite the eight aforementioned countries to participate in a 
conference for the development of the region.  It was primarily to be a forum in which 
government ministers could "exchange views frankly and candidly.  There would be no 
decisions, only an exchange of views on how the eight countries might best move forward 
toward prosperity."223  This would "encourage a more autonomous attitude among 
countries which receive economic assistance" and "avoid the sense of inferiority which often 
leads such countries to dislike donor countries."224  A pertinent concern was whether 
neutralist countries, such as Indonesia and Cambodia, would attend the conference.  But if 
the idea worked out, it could become be an excellent opportunity for Japan to rehabilitate 
its ties with Southeast Asian countries and benefit economically.  The link between Japan 
and the region would be more secure.  Eventually, the conference was held from 6-7 April 
1966 in Tokyo.  Black reported that the Japan felt great pride for hosting its first major 
international conference relating to Asian development.  It was a "major diplomatic 
achievement" because Indonesia and Cambodia sent observers to the meeting.225  With this, 
Black was "satisfied" at the US success in "bringing the Japanese to the point where they are 
prepared to do more in the aid field in Southeast Asia."226
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  It further confirmed Japan as the 
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premier US partner in Southeast Asian affairs which would, hopefully, ease the burden on 
American resources. 
 
On the American side, Black made two tours of Asia in April-May and October-
November 1966, visiting many Southeast Asian countries.  On his April-May trip, Black 
intended to have "unhurried discussions with a number of key figures in Thailand, the 
Philippines, Laos, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Korea and Japan" and possibly 
even stop by Burma.  With the US having met U Thant's request of supporting the ADB and 
the Nam Gum dam in Laos, the purpose of this visit was to "obtain a clearer picture from the 
Asian leaders themselves of what they think and propose…be done to bring about a stepping 
up to economic and social development programs in Southeast Asia…in the fields of 
education, health and agriculture."227
Governments from Singapore to Seoul see regional 
cooperation as the best long-range alternative to Red 
Chinese domination of Southeast Asia…disparate fellows 
[such] as Lee Kwan Yew, Thanat Khoman and Marcos…are in 
the mood to step up their cooperation right now and are 
searching for effective means to do so….They recognize 
there will be further trials in Vietnam, but they seem 
satisfied that the demonstration of American willingness to 
back up its commitments where necessary will make it 
unlikely for American military power to be called on again 
(emphasis added).
  One of the major regional schemes implemented by 
his second trip from October-November was the establishment of the Southeast Asian 
Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO), headquartered in Bangkok.  Heartened by 
such endeavours, Black reported in December 1966 that: 
228
Congratulating US efforts in precipitating Southeast Asian regionalism, Black also 
commented that: 
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Asians are beginning to know each other better and a habit 
is beginning to form of Asians meeting together to discuss 
their own problems.  This process has an accelerating effect 
on all forms of cooperation, the political effects of which are 
obvious.  This is a reversal of the former habit of Asian 
countries dealing directly and almost exclusively with the 
colonial powers (emphasis added).229
 
 
The satisfaction US officials felt was indeed justified.  Southeast Asian states expanded their 
bilateral ties with Japan and each other.  Japan was also increasingly established as the 
leading country in Asia and one that was closely linked to the US.  Under American 
supervision, the ADB was founded and Japan-initiated developmental projects proceeded.  
This was the fulfillment of the regional vision cast by officials in the Truman administration 
that saw the US "exerting a cautiously moderating influence" and providing "discreet 
support and guidance" in Southeast Asian affairs by "encourag[ing]…Asian states to take the 
lead in political matters."230  American security needs in Asia was also met in these 
enterprises because they "develop[ed] the economic interdependence between SEA, as a 
supplier of raw materials, and Japan, western Europe and India, as suppliers of finished 
goods."231
[e]ncourage the prompt organization of an economic 
grouping by the maximum number of free Asian states, 
including Japan and as many of the Colombo Powers as 
possible based on self-help and mutual aid, and the 
participation and support (including substantial financial 
assistance) of the United States and other appropriate 
Western countries, through which, by united action, those 
free Asian states will be enabled more effectively to achieve 
  More specifically, the ADB and Japanese efforts were the realization of the goal 
in the Eisenhower administration to: 
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the economic and social strength needed to maintain their 
independence.232
Thus in 1966, the regionalism and development finally took the form envisaged by US 
policymakers in the 1940s and 50s. 
 
 
ASEAN: Forging a Regional Compact 
Restarting Regionalism 
After developments from 1965-67, indigenous Southeast Asian regionalism came to fruition.  
By the end of 1965, some of the inhibitions to progress in Southeast Asian regional 
cooperation had been removed.  Singapore separated from Malaysia in August 1965, 
thereby bringing partial end to the Malaysia problem, and Sukarno was effectively toppled 
by a military coup in 30 September the same year, leaving General Suharto the de facto 
leader of Indonesia.  However, Konfrontasi did not end immediately.  Seizing the opportunity 
to propel regional cooperation forward, the Thai government at the end of November 1965 
sent a request to Malaysia and the Philippines to restart ASA meetings.233
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  However, the 
journey towards regional reconciliation and unity would prove difficult because of the 
manifold political differences between Southeast Asian nation-states.  The solution was 
found in focusing on economic, technical and cultural exchange and cooperation as the basis 
for regionalism.  Emphasizing developmental cooperation was the only way by which 
Southeast Asian states could associate themselves in a regional grouping.  It was broad 
enough to accommodate their often divisive regional political agendas while ensuring a 
common denominator, the desire to prosper, through which a forum could be established 
for them to communicate and resolve their differences. 




The Thai proposal to revive ASA elicited several responses.  The Tunku expressed 
hope that the organization could be expanded to include more members.  Thanat was less 
forthcoming on this point but welcomed Singapore to join.  Singapore, however, had no 
interest in joining ASA.  Francis D'Costa, Permanent Secretary of the Singapore Ministry of 
Foreign affairs attributed this to the fact that ASA were "aligned."234  At that point in time, 
Singapore adopted a non-aligned stance.  The Philippines had reservations over the plan as 
Malaysia-Philippines relations had not been mended.  Additionally, Foreign Secretary 
Narciso Ramos told the new Philippine President, Ferdinand Marcos, that while the 
government was "committed to all that ASA stands for, it would not be to its national 
interest to pronounce a sentence of doom for MAPHILINDO, which Indonesia might consider 
as a rebuff against her."235  On the other hand, Philippine standing was enhanced by the ADB 
headquarters on its soil.  Thus, Ramos also suggested that a new approach to regionalism 
was needed and that the Philippines was in a good position to lead it.  Hence, from his point 
of view, ASA should be "a transitory arrangement, a stepping stone, toward the formation of 
the Organization of Asian States, with a call for wider collective action to achieve Asian 
progress."236
 
  The dual objectives of attaining regional unity and Philippine pre-eminence 
would then be met. 
Despite these outstanding issues and considerations, ASA resumed in April 1966.  A 
joint working party met to discuss "more than 30 proposals for mutual cooperation in the 
economic, social and cultural fields between Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand."237
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also paved the way for the ASA foreign ministers meeting in August 1966.  At this time, 
Malaysia and the Philippines had yet to normalize relations, but their commitment to ASA 
could be argued to have a positive influence on the process.  The leader of the Philippine 
delegation expressed that "through our [ASA members] concerted action in economic, 
technical, cultural and educational projects, we hope to be able to solve some of the 
problems common to all three of us."238  The new Indonesian foreign minister, Adam Malik, 
also requested the Philippines to delay restoring ties with Malaysia in order that policies 
could be coordinated with Indonesia.  This was part of the post-Sukarno reorientation of 
Indonesian foreign policy towards regional affairs.  Indonesia intended to rehabilitate ties 
with its neighbours, but questions remained regarding its place and role in Southeast Asia.239
 
 
By June 1966, Malaysia-Philippines ties were mended and a rapprochement 
between Indonesia and Malaysia was also on the horizon.  The foreign ministers from both 
countries, Malik and Tun Abdul Razak respectively, had met in Bangkok at the end of May 
1966 to discuss the normalization of Indonesian-Malaysian relations.  Regional cooperation 
was on the agenda and the central question was the means by which Indonesia would be 
brought into association with other Southeast Asian states.  Indonesia needed "to avoid 
giving the impression of capitulation [with the ending of Konfrontasi] and an attendant 
demeaning acceptance of membership in an established association which comprised states 
whose foreign policies violated values espoused by the Republic."240
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Malaysia, he proposed to Malik a regional organization to replace ASA so as to bring 
Indonesia back into the fold of Southeast Asian affairs.241  Malik later revealed to the French 
ambassador in Jakarta that he would ensure Sukarno's acceptance of the new regional body 
by assuring that he would be its first chairman.242
We look forward to a regional association embracing 
Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Laos and 
Vietnam….What is important is that the organisation should 
be based on the principles of economic, social and cultural 
cooperation.  I cannot think of a single country in South-East 
Asia which would repudiate these principles….Such a 
community would not be a military alliance.  It would not be 
an anti-communist alliance.  Nor, for that matter, would it 
be an anti-Western alliance….I myself envisage an 
organization which would be first and last, pro-Southeast 
Asia, pro-development, pro-regional cooperation and pro-
peace.  I do not believe that military blocs and alliances, by 
themselves, can provide a lasting solution to the problem of 
Communist expansionism (emphasis mine).
  Even though Sukarno had effectively lost 
power to Suharto, he was at this point still President of Indonesia and had some influence in 
the country's affairs.  Therefore, Sukarno's acquiescence was important in facilitating 
Indonesia's efforts to rehabilitate ties with its neighbours.  Thus, the stage seemed set for a 
new regional organization to be birthed in Southeast Asia.  The outlines of the grouping 
were laid out when the Malaysian acting foreign minister, Tun Abdul Rahman Ismail, 




The Boundaries of Regional Association 
There are several important points about the necessity of a new regional association.  The 
need for it to be inclusive of the neutralist states did not change as it was envisioned not to 
be anti-Communist.  Thus, there again was a deliberate and concerted effort to bring these 
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states, particularly Indonesia, into regional cooperation.  Although ASA could be expanded 
for it had all along welcomed Indonesia's participation, Indonesian pride was on the line.  
Suharto was interested in regionalism but retained longstanding views about Indonesia's 
primary role in establishing a stable regional order.  He was open to "reviv[ing] the idea of 
Maphilindo in a wider sphere" because of Indonesia's prominent role in its founding, but 
was averse to ASA because of its anti-Communist, pro-American composition.244  A fresh 
start was required.  Second, Maphilindo could be built upon.  But, it was unfortunately 
ethnically-based and created specifically to resolve the conflict arising from the formation of 
Malaysia and, therefore, unsuited to the situation in 1966 that had moved beyond it.  
Malaysia also considered it a failed experiment.245
 
  Another way was to merge the two 
organizations.  However, this would invite protest from Malaysia or the Philippines because 
of national prestige from their status as initiators of these organizations.  With these 
considerations in mind, it was more expedient to create an entirely new regional body in 
Southeast Asia that comprised the membership of ASA and Maphilindo.  But, it took time for 
the involved parties to decide on the best way forward and this was not resolved until well 
into 1967. 
Ismail's statement to the press strongly highlighted the undesirability of a military, 
anti-Communist pact.  This was likely a response to the inauguration of the Asian and Pacific 
Council (ASPAC) in Seoul, June 1966, and was a consistent position held by Malaysia since 
SEAFET.  ASPAC was originally meant as a security pact of non-Communist countries to 
explore cooperation against Communist expansion.  Malaysia, the Philippines, South 
Vietnam and Thailand participated in the conference while Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos 
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attended as observers.246  Even though Malaysia was anti-Communist, its protest against this 
kind of regional organization had already been made clear when its delegate to the ASPAC 
conference, the Minister of Education, Inche Mohamaed Khir Johari, declared that "it is not 
in line with our [Malaysian] policy to be drawn into or encourage any military pacts, even if 
they are militantly anti-Communist.  We have steered clear of such pacts and will continue 
to do so.  If these topics crop up, we will oppose them vigorously….There are other more 
important things than military pacts.  Regional cooperation in the development of cultural 
and economic ties is more vital in this region."247
 
 
 Indonesia articulated a similar line.  The formal ending of Konfrontasi on 13 August 
1966 cleared the way for progress in regional cooperation with active Indonesian 
participation.  In December 1966, Malik announced that "Indonesia would take the lead in 
establishing regional economic and cultural co-operation to achieve a united South-East 
Asia."248  But, Malik rejected a regional military alliance as against Indonesian national 
principles as laid down by the People's Consultative Assembly.  Foreign policy was to be 
based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution: "Independent and active, opposed to 
imperialism and colonialism in all their forms, and participating in implementing a world role 
based on independence, abiding peace and social justice."249  At that point in time, the 
Indonesian government was invoking these principles against Sukarno.  Thus, to enter into a 
regional defence pact for a military-oriented grouping would be inconsistent with these 
principles.250
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  Domestic politics constrained the kind of regional cooperation Indonesia could 
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By the same measure, Indonesia's stance dictated that it be against the British bases 
in Singapore.  The bases also seemed to be a topic of interest to the Indonesian military.  
Both issues, Indonesian principles and bases, could hinder progress in Southeast Asian 
cooperation if Singapore was included in the proposed membership of the new regional 
organization.  The newly independent city-state was certainly keen to join.  After the 
cessation of Konfrontasi in August 1966, Singapore's ministers increasingly raised interest in 
and support for regionalism on the basis of economic, technical and cultural cooperation.251  
The tenets of Singapore's foreign policy had been articulated in the parliamentary sittings on 
16 and 17 December 1965.  Foreign Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam declared that 
"Singapore's foreign policy, based on a realistic appraisal of the position we occupy in South-
East Asia, will…not be postulated on the basis of permanent enemies" but will take the 
"more positive approach of cultivating as many permanent friends as we are capable of."252  
Furthermore, by this time, Singapore had achieved legitimacy in the Afro-Asian bloc by 
gaining recognition from most of its members.  Its leaders turned to regional developments.  
In the 1966 National Day Address, Rajaratnam expressed that although Singapore was non-
aligned it was "not non-aligned in regard to matters relating to peace and economic 
development in the region."253  However, "the only kind of regional cooperation which 
Singapore will be averse to is one based on antagonism towards other nations or group of 
nations."254
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  This thus precluded Singapore's participation in any military grouping, and by 
extension the use the British bases, for non-defensive purposes.  Participation in ASPAC was 
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not an option for Singapore.  But, its security and economic interest was an impetus for 
Singapore ministers to participate in regionalism lest it become isolated as a Chinese-
dominated island in a historically Malay area in the region. 
 
The Indonesians were aware of the economic importance of the bases to Singapore 
and that they were necessary for the British to sustain their defence commitments to 
Southeast Asia.  But, if Indonesia were to enter into a regional organization with Singapore, 
the resulting domestic political implications had to be dealt with.  For this reason, in 
December 1966, Jakarta proposed a draft agreement for the new regional organization 
which contained a clause stating "that foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not 
allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of their 
countries, and that arrangements of collective defence should not be used to serve the 
particular interest of any of the big powers."255
 
  It should be noted that this stance dated 
from the early 1960s.  Thus, the basis for association was very limited: mutual benefit by 
economic, technical and cultural progress and exchange in Southeast Asia and in no way 
aligned with or directed against outside powers or blocs.  This draft agreement led to the 
declaration of the South East Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC) by the 
foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand in early 1967. 
Developing the Desired Institution 
With the fundamental premise of a new regional organization in place, it was only a matter 
of time before it was formalized.  But, there was also much confusion as to how the new 
institution would be established.  By January 1967, three regional initiatives, ASA, 
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Maphilindo and SEAARC, were in place and the involved Southeast Asian leaders simply 
could not decide which organization to expand upon or abandon.  Malaysia and the 
Philippines held on strongly to ASA while Indonesia could not bear to be anything less than a 
founding member of a regional body.  Arnfinn Jorgensen Dahl argues that besides the Tunku 
being attached to his brainchild, ASA, both Kuala Lumpur and Manila could have been 
uncomfortable with some aspects of the SEAARC declaration: that regional defence was the 
primary responsibility of Southeast Asians; and that foreign bases were temporary.  Both 
countries had extensive defensive ties with the British and Americans respectively.  SEAARC 
could impinge on their national security interests, explaining their reluctance to relinquish 
ASA and insisting that the new organization be built upon it instead.256  It was imperative to 
resolve the debate.  Thanat and Malik spearheaded this process.  Thanat would persuade 
the Philippine and Malaysian side to move on from ASA while Malik would get Burma and 
Cambodia on board the project.257  Thanat was successful in this endeavour as by May 1967, 
Malaysia and the Philippines no longer insisted that ASA be expanded to include 
Indonesia.258
 
  Malik, however, was unable to secure Burmese and Cambodian participation.  
Fundamentally, their neutralist position remained unchanged from 1959.  But, the proposed 
inclusion of Singapore would add to the neutral bent of the organization and make it seem 
less pro-West. 
The price exacted on the Malaysians and the Philippines to accommodate 
Indonesian pride and bring the country into regional association was soon repaid.  Thanat 
arranged a meeting in Bangkok in early August 1967 to decide on the SEAARC draft 
agreement.  However, the Philippine delegation was unwilling to accept it in full, preferring 
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that matters pertaining to security not be mentioned at all.  Excepting Indonesia, this was 
generally agreed upon by Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  The post-Sukarno order in 
Indonesia required that the new regional organization be agreeable with domestic politics 
and congruent with the historic Indonesian position.  Thus, the clause of foreign bases was 
included in the SEAARC draft.  The relevant portion of the SEAARC draft read: 
Being in agreement that foreign bases are temporary in 
nature and should not be allowed to be used directly or 
indirectly to subvert the national independence of their 
countries, and that the arrangements of collective defence 




A compromise was found and the resultant draft was accepted.  The abovementioned part 
of the draft was modified and the last clause was amended to read: 
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain 
only with the expressed concurrence of the countries 
concerned and are not intended to be used directly or 
indirectly to subvert the national independence and 
freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly 
processes of their national development.260
 
 
With this resolved, ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 by the foreign ministers of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  The articles in the ASEAN 
declaration mention little about political and security issues except for the segment cited 
above.  Even so, it was worded to accommodate varying political interpretations of security 
needs of ASEAN members, highlighting the centrality of these issues in Southeast Asia.  
Furthermore, one notes the strong focus on development.  Because of the many political 
differences that separated the founding members of ASEAN, the only aspect agreeable to all 
parties was economic, technical and cultural cooperation and exchange.  The establishment 
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of ASEAN, however, did not mean that the five countries knew how to proceed with it nor 
did the outstanding political problems disappear overnight.  But, at least, a forum was now 
available through which the ASEAN five could dialogue and retain diplomatic ties at the 
regional level should bilateral ones turn sour.  From the 1970s onwards, the issue of foreign 
bases would diminish, leaving Southeast Asia with an extremely malleable institution to 
direct its future in some form of harmony.  But in 1967, although regional association was 
achieved, its future was uncertain. 
 
Conclusion 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia finally took the shape US policymakers, and to a large extent, 
Southeast Asian leaders, desired.  In 1945, policymakers in the Truman administration 
thought that US objectives in the region would best be served by "a Far East progressively 
developing into a group of self-governing states—independent or with Dominion status—
which would cooperate with each other and with the Western powers on a basis of mutual 
self-respect and friendship."261
                                                            
261 Policy paper prepared in the Department of State, "An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the 
Pacific at the Close of the War and the Objectives and Policies of the United States," 22 June 1945, 
FRUS 1945, Vol.6, pp.557-558. 
  From 1965, President Johnson pursued development-
focused multilateralism as a means of bringing peace to the Third World.  From the 
American perspective, ASEAN is arguably the multilateral grouping they sought as the 
member states had a formal organization to facilitate regional cooperation and they each 
had military and/or economic ties with the US.  Because Southeast Asians also thought that 
cooperation in development was the best way to achieve regional stability, there was 
parallelism in US and Southeast Asian goals.  By 1967, a trinitarian structure of stability for 
the maintenance of American and Southeast Asian interests comprising the ADB, SEATO and 
ASEAN was in place.  They enabled the US to cover all grounds—economic, military and 
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political—a watershed in US-Southeast Asia diplomatic relations and held great promise for 
peace on both sides.  Yet, regional stability was to prove elusive as the US sank deeper into 
the Vietnam quagmire.  Following that, the region erupted into conflict as ASEAN faced its 






In this thesis, I have discussed the creation of SEATO, the ADB and ASEAN and demonstrated 
how these organizations were the result of both long-term US foreign policy planning as well 
as American and Southeast Asian responses to regional problems.  In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, Truman administration officials were confronted with the pressing 
problem to decolonize Southeast Asia in a manner that would ensure regional stability and 
prevent the spread of Communism.  Southeast Asia was strategically important because of 
the trade routes that connected the raw materials in Asia to industrial Japan and Europe.  It 
was also necessary to expedite post-war recovery in Japan and Europe.  With the 
decolonization wars erupting in Southeast Asia and with the rapidly deteriorating 
relationship between the Allied countries and the USSR, it was imperative for the US and its 
allies to secure this interest.  Moreover, after the fall of China to the Communists in October 
1949, it became more urgent for Washington to ensure Japan's alignment with American 
goals by providing a steady supply of raw materials from Southeast Asia. 
 
 To solve this myriad of problems, US policymakers proposed to foster regional 
cooperation in Asia.  American aid and technical assistance would be used to guide 
regionalism, strengthen Asian societies, thereby making Communism unappealing and 
keeping the newly independent counties aligned with US objectives.  This would also 
encourage decolonizing states to cooperate with one another based on shared cultural 
characteristics and the need for economic development.  In developing such regionalism, 
Washington refrained from taking the initiative, preferring instead to encourage Asians to 
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lead the process while providing "discreet support and guidance" through bilateral ties.262
 
  
This was pragmatic for America because in the 1940s, Washington concentrated more on 
European affairs and did not desire a military solution to Southeast Asian problems.  
Additionally, the region was still the domain of the European colonial powers.  Thus, the US 
adopted a hands-off approach.  Moreover, the US position also reflected the American 
preference for and familiarity with bilateral relations.  However, the outbreak of the Korean 
War sparked fears in Washington of Chinese Communist expansion by military means.  The 
immediate response was the creation of SEATO, a military regional organization, in 1954 
specifically to meet this conventional military threat.  As a demonstration of American 
commitment to Southeast Asia, SEATO was not a military alliance like NATO, but a collective 
defence mechanism on a budget.  The US was reluctant to be heavily involved in Southeast 
Asia.  Nevertheless, it meant that the Americans had an ostensible direct military stake in 
the region.  However, it also cemented the division in US foreign policy towards mainland 
and island Southeast Asia.  Thereafter, American action on the mainland was essentially 
military while that in the island area was indirect through economic and technical assistance. 
 SEATO was the limit of US participation in military regional cooperation in Southeast 
Asia.  Development-based regionalism was emphasized from the mid-1950s onwards as 
President Eisenhower sought a relatively cheap means to honour US commitments to the 
region.  With modernization theory gaining popularity in academic and government circles, 
aid and developmental assistance became the focus of US multilateralism in island 
Southeast Asia.  It was also a response to changes in Soviet strategy which saw Khrushchev 
trying to cultivate Third World friends by offering aid.  In the face of the Bandung 
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Conference's challenge to SEATO and the British-initiated Colombo Plan as representative of 
Southeast Asian voices, Washington too was compelled to play the aid game.  As 
multilateralism was thought to provide maximum benefit with minimal cost, US officials 
proposed expanding the Colombo Plan into a formal regional association.  But, they met 
with difficulties in making it a useful and acceptable organization for both Asian and Western 
participants.  The Americans were inexperienced in such collaborative endeavours and were 
unreceptive to Asian proposals on how US funds could be used.  Additionally, Asian leaders 
were not open to the multilateral disbursement of aid for fear that it would diminish US 
bilateral promises of funding.  Regional cooperation hit a roadblock by the end of the 1950s. 
 
 The stalemate soon ended with Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman's proposal 
to create the South-East Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) in 1959.  Thailand 
and the Philippines also expressed interest in this regional plan.  These Southeast Asian 
states pursued a regionalism that envisioned inter-state cooperation to promote political 
stability and resolve bilateral problems by means of economic, technical and cultural 
exchanges.  It was also a reaction to US reluctance to increase assistance to these countries 
and Southeast Asian uncertainty towards the US military commitment to the region.  
However, indigenous regional mechanisms faced the difficulty of gaining the acceptance and 
participation of other Southeast Asian states.  SEAFET and ASA did not appeal to the 
neutralist countries, particularly Indonesia, while Maphilindo was essentially an ethnically 
Malay grouping with a specific goal to resolve the issues arising from the creation of 
Malaysia, but failed to do so.  Because of these obstacles, regional cooperation in Southeast 
Asia was stalled by mid-1965.  Nonetheless, these experiments gave the participants 
valuable experience in the requirements for fostering unity.  In driving regionalism, the 
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countries in island Southeast Asia inadvertently pursued a course parallel to American 
objectives.  US unwillingness to give more aid ironically resulted in the desired outcome. 
 
Finally in 1965, significant progress was made on both the American and Southeast 
Asian sides, resulting in the realization of their respective visions of regional cooperation.  US 
President Johnson doggedly pursued peace through development and was able to persuade 
the Free World to cooperate with the US in this enterprise.  This led to the creation of the 
ADB in 1966 with Japan as its leading Asian member.  The ADB's focus on Asia, its large Asian 
membership, Japanese leadership and multilateral funding represented the fulfillment of the 
plan for regional cooperation articulated by officials of the Truman administration in the 
1940s.  On the part of the Southeast Asians, talks to create a regional organization restarted 
after a hiatus following the partial resolution to the Malaysia problem with the separation of 
Singapore and the overthrow of Indonesian President Sukarno.  However, it was only in 1967 
that a new regional organization, ASEAN was formed.  It was able to accommodate the 
various interests and sensitivities of all Southeast Asian states because it was based upon 
developmental cooperation and exchange, a goal none of the participants would disagree 
with.  Thus, a measure of peace could be attained. 
 
General Observations on Regionalism in Southeast Asia 
Several points about the development of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia can be 
made.  First, it would not work without the agreement of Southeast Asians themselves who 
were members of their countries' non-leftist elites.  Because the US sought to guide and 
support regionalism from behind the scenes, it may appear that the Americans manipulated 
events to their interests.  However, this is a cynical interpretation of the US involvement in 
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Southeast Asian regional cooperation and one that does not satisfactorily account for 
indigenous interests and agency.  While American officials recognized the political 
sensitivities of a regionalism too aligned with the West and saw that their ends could be best 
achieved by multilateral arrangements, the US was not a particularly adroit player in 
Southeast Asian affairs.  Washington hoped that a background role would enable a high 
degree of participation by Southeast Asians, empowering them and lessen the US burden in 
the region.  Yet it would take approximately twenty years, from 1945-65, for Washington to 
learn to conduct diplomacy in a multilateral framework.  Certainly, the development of 
Southeast Asian regional cooperation can be said to be a key experience in American 
participation in international organizations. 
 
Second, there was a high degree of parallelism in the American and Southeast Asian 
interest in regional cooperation.  Both sides saw it as a means to stabilize the region and 
protect it from Communist expansion.  It must be recognized that the Cold War in Southeast 
Asia was also fought as nation-building wars between nationalists of different political 
alignments and between pro-West or pro-Soviet ideologies.  Because early Southeast Asia-
initiated regional plans (SEAFET and ASA) comprised pro-West countries, they had an anti-
Communist flavour.  Yet, this did not hinder the larger goal of carving out geopolitical space 
for Southeast Asian states to survive and flourish in the post-war international order.  Hence, 
efforts were made, albeit unsuccessfully, to incorporate staunchly neutralist states 
(Indonesia, Burma and Cambodia) during ASEAN's formation.  Eventually, only ASEAN 
succeeded in bringing all the nation-states in Southeast Asia into its membership.  And that 




One might even argue that there was a convergence in US and Southeast Asian goals 
in pursuing regionalism.  The ADB and ASEAN are separate institutions but they were 
established to achieve development and bring stability to the region.  Furthermore, the 
founding member-states of ASEAN were also participants in the ADB.  While ASEAN was 
ostensibly formed to promote economic, technical and cultural cooperation, its true concern 
was negotiating the political differences between Southeast Asian nation-states by creating 
regional dialogue platform.  Nonetheless, whether development was the means or the end, 
it enabled Americans, their allies and Southeast Asian leaders to collaborate for the purpose 
of bringing stability to a troubled part of the world. 
 
Finally, because of the constant emphasis on developmental cooperation, it can be 
argued that ideology underpinned Southeast Asian regional cooperation.  Therefore, the 
development of regionalism can be seen as regional integration.  But Southeast Asians 
disagreed on how to actualize developmental cooperation.  Undoubtedly, more differences 
than similarities existed among the Southeast Asian nation-states.  In fact, colonialism, 
decolonization, the Cold War, nation-building, the jostling for regional pre-eminence and 
international recognition and inter-state rivalries greatly fractured the region such that there 
was hardly any basis for regional unity.  Therefore, one of their greatest challenges in nation-
building was to learn diplomacy and live with each other.  That Southeast Asians fostered 
some sort of unity in the form of ASEAN in just twenty years after the Second World War 
was remarkable.  The speed at which they attained a measure of regional integration was 
unparalleled.  As I have argued in this thesis, the obstacles to regional cooperation in the 
region were diligently negotiated by Southeast Asian leaders but they were not always 
successful until a common basis for unity could be found—development.  Modernization 
and societal development was desired as these leaders sought to make their countries 
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prosper.  Furthermore, the experiments in regionalism always had a functionalist, conflict 
resolution role.  This was especially the case for Maphilindo and to a lesser degree, ASEAN.  
Moreover, the priority of Southeast Asian leaders was to safeguard their countries' 
independence.  Simply put, in the Cold War and decolonization context, Southeast Asians 
cooperated with each other because they needed a means to resolve outstanding bilateral 
and regional issues and bring stability in order that their independence and survival would 




ASEAN eventually became the organization that represented Southeast Asian interests 
globally.  Over the years, its membership expanded to include the rest of Southeast Asia: 
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.  As of July 2012, ASEAN has yet to decide 
Timor Leste's admission to the organization because of questions surrounding its ability to 
fulfill ASEAN membership requirements.  Nonetheless, Timor Leste's membership has been 
affirmed in principle and was strongly supported by Indonesia.  This highlights Southeast 
Asia's commitment to cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution.  Recognizing this shift, 
the US transferred its diplomatic energy at the regional level to ASEAN.  Thus shortly after 
the dismantling of SEATO, the first US-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
Dialogue was held in September 1977.  The US representative, Richard N. Cooper, United 
States Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, hailed ASEAN as a “positive force for 
peace, development and prosperity in the region.”263
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  This initial dialogue relationship has 
since expanded US relations with the ASEAN area and countries, resulting in treaty 
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agreements over a range of international security and trade issues.  ASEAN has also 
established dialogue relationships with other regional blocs, global and regional 
heavyweights. 
 
To conclude, it is worth noting that the Bangkok declaration's emphasis on 
economic, technical and cultural cooperation and exchange not only paved the way for 
regional unity in 1967, but has also made ASEAN very malleable and relevant to regional and 
international shifts in dynamics.  Development remains a priority for the newer and poorer 
ASEAN members, giving them the incentive to join the organization.  In the name of 
economic progress, ASEAN also mediates and cushions regional members from emerging 
economic powerhouses such as China and India.  Under this umbrella and with the 1994 
formalization of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Southeast Asian regional cooperation has also 
extended into the political and security spheres.  The willingness to discuss these sensitive 
issues seems to indicate ASEAN's maturation as a regional organization has arrived.  While 
one can surmise whether ASEAN will develop to be as formal and institutionalized as the 
European Union, it must be remembered that ASEAN was designed to protect its members' 
sovereignty, not cause it to be surrendered for regional unity.  Southeast Asian nation-states 





Appendix A: Major Regional Organizations in Southeast Asia, 1967264
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Appendix B: Bangkok Declaration, 1961265




The Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, The Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of the Philippines and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand: 
Upholding the ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being: 
Believing that these ideals can best be attained by fostering good understanding, good 
neighbourliness and active co-operation among nations; 
Desiring to establish a firm foundation for common action to further economic and social 
progress in Southeast Asia; 
Convinced that mutual cooperation in the economic field and cultural relationship will 
greatly contribute to their endeavour to enhance the welfare of their respective nations and 
promote better understanding and mutual appreciation among their peoples; 
Do hereby declare: 
First, the establishment of an association for economic and cultural cooperation among the 
countries of Southeast Asia to be known as ASA - Association of Southeast Asia. 
Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be: 
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1. To establish an effective machinery for friendly consultations, collaboration and 
mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and administrative 
fields; 
2. To provide educational, professional, technical and their administrative training and 
research facilities in their respective countries for national and officials of the 
associated countries; 
3. To exchange information of matters of common interest or concern in the economic, 
cultural, education and scientific fields; 
4. To cooperate in the promotion of Southeast Asian Studies; 
5. To provide a machinery for fruitful collaboration in utilization of their respective 
natural resources, the development of their agriculture and industry, the expansion 
of their trade, the improvement of their transport and communication facilities, and 
generally raising the living standards of their peoples; 
6. To cooperate in the study of the problems of international commodity trade; and 
7. Generally, to consult and cooperate with one another so as to achieve the aims and 
purposes of the Association, as well as to contribute more effectively to the work of 
existing international organizations and agencies. 
Third, that this Association is in no way connected with any outside power or power bloc 
and is directed against no other country, but is essentially a free association of countries of 
Southeast Asia having as its objectives the promotion, through joint endeavour, of the well-
being and the economic, social and cultural progress of this region. 
This Declaration, made at Bangkok, this thirty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and sixty-




Appendix C: Manila Accord, 1963266
Adopted in Manila on June 11, 1963, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the 
Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines. 
 
 
The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the 
Republic of the Philippines, prompted by their keen and common desire to have a general 
exchange of views on current problems concerning stability, security, economic 
development, and social progress of the three countries and of the region and upon the 
initiative of President Diosdado Macapagal, agreed that a Conference of Ministers of the 
three countries be held in Manila on the 7th June, 1963, for the purpose of achieving 
common understanding and close fraternal co-operation among themselves.  Accordingly, 
Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Dr. Subandrio, Deputy 
First Minister/Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, and Hon. Emmanuel 
Pelaez, Vice-President of the Philippines and concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, met 
in Manila from 7th to 11th June, 1963. 
The deliberations were held in a frank manner and in a most cordial atmosphere in 
keeping the spirit of friendship prevailing in the various meetings held between President 
Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia, and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra of the 
Federation of Malaya, and President Diosdado Macapagal.  This Ministerial Conference was 
a manifestation of the determination of the nations in this region to achieve closer co-
operation in their endeavour to chart their common future. 
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121 
 
The Ministers were of one mind that the three countries share a primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in 
any form of manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities, and to 
ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and of their region, in 
accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples. 
In the same spirit of common and constructive endeavour, they exchanged views on 
the proposed Confederation of Nations of Malay origin, the proposed Federation of 
Malaysia, and the Philippine claim to North Borneo and related problems. 
THE MACAPAGAL PLAN 
Recognising that it is in the common interest of their countries to maintain fraternal 
relations and to strengthen co-operation among their peoples who are bound together by 
ties of race and culture, the three Ministers agreed to intensify the joint and individual 
efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress, and prosperity for themselves 
and for their neighbours. 
In this context, the three Ministers supported President Macapagal's plan envisaging 
the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest harmony but 
without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty.  This calls for the establishment of 
common organs. 
The three Ministers agreed to take the initial steps towards this ultimate aim by 
establishing machinery for frequent and regular consultations.  The details of such 
machinery will be further defined.  This machinery will enable the three Governments to 
hold regular consultations at all levels to deal with matters of mutual interest and concern 
consistent with the national, regional, and international responsibilities or obligations of 
each country without prejudice to its sovereignty and independence.  The Ministers agreed 
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that their countries will endeavour to achieve close understanding and co-operation in 
dealing with common problems related to security, stability, economic, social, and cultural 
development. 
In order to accelerate the process of growth towards the ultimate establishment of 
President Macapagal's plan, the Ministers agreed that each country shall set up its own 
national secretariat.  Pending the establishment of a central secretariat for the consultative 
machinery, the national secretaries should co-ordinate and co-operate with each other in 
the fulfilment of their tasks. 
The Ministers further agreed to recommend that Heads of Government and Foreign 
Ministers meet at least once a year for the purpose of consultation on matters of 
importance and common concern. 
MALAYSIA AND NORTH BORNEO 
The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' adherence t the principle of self-
determination for the peoples of non-self-governing territories.  In this context, Indonesia 
and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the 
support of the people of the Borneo Territories is ascertained by an independent and 
impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative. 
The Federation of Malaya expressed appreciation for this attitude of Indonesia and 
the Philippines and undertook to consult the British Government and the Governments of 
the Borneo Territories with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or 
his representative to take the necessary steps in order to ascertain the wishes of the people 
of those Territories. 
The Philippines made it clear that its position on the inclusion of North Borneo in the 
Federation of Malaysia is subject to the final outcome of the Philippines claim to North 
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Borneo.  The Ministers took note of the Philippine claim and the right of the Philippines to 
continue to pursue it in accordance with international law and the principle of the pacific 
settlement of disputes.  They agreed that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of 
Malaysia would not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder.  Moreover, the in the 
context of their close association, the three countries agreed to exert their best endeavours 
to bring the claim to a just and expeditious solution by peaceful means, such as negotiation, 
conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the Parties' 
own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations and the Bandung 
Declaration. 
In particular, considering the close historical ties between the peoples of the 
Philippines and North Borneo as well as their geographical propinquity, the Ministers agreed 
that in the event of North Borneo joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia the 
Government of the latter and the Government of the Philippines should maintain and 
promote the harmony and the friendly relations subsisting in their region to ensure the 
security and stability of the area. 
MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT 
The Ministers agreed to recommend that a meeting of their respective Heads of 
Government be held in Manila not later than the end of July, 1963. 
The Ministers expressed satisfaction over the atmosphere of brotherliness and 
cordiality which pervaded their meeting and considered it as a confirmation of their close 
fraternal ties and as a happy augury for the success of future consultations among their 
leaders. 
The Ministers agreed to place on record their profound appreciation of and 
gratitude for the statesmanlike efforts of President Macapagal, whose courage, vision, and 
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inspiration not only facilitated the holding of this historic meeting but also contributed 
towards the achievement for the first time of a unity of purpose and a sense of common 
dedication among the peoples of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  
125 
 
Appendix D: Agreement Establishing The Asian Development Bank, 
1965267
Adopted in Manila on December 4, 1965, at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened 
by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. 
 
 
Considering the importance of closer economic co-operation as a means for achieving the 
most efficient utilization of resources and for accelerating the economic development of 
Asia and the Far East; 
Realizing the significance of making additional development financing available for the 
region by mobilizing such funds and other resources both from within and outside the 
region, and by seeking to create and foster conditions conducive to increased domestic 
savings and greater flow of development funds into the region; 
Recognizing the desirability of promoting the harmonious growth of the economies of 
the region and the expansion of external trade of member countries; 
Convinced that the establishment of a financial institution that is Asian in its basic 
character would serve these ends; 
Have agreed to establish hereby the Asian Development Bank (hereafter called the 
"Bank") which shall operate in accordance with the following Articles of Agreement. 
 
CHAPTER I: PURPOSE, FUNCTIONS AND MEMBERSHIP 
                                                            
267 Agreement Establishing The Asian Development Bank, adopted in Manila on December 4, 1965, at 
the Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 





The purpose of the Bank shall be to foster economic growth and co-operation in the 
region of Asia and the Far East (hereafter referred to as the "region") and to contribute to 
the acceleration of the process of economic development of the developing member 
countries in the region, collectively and individually.  Wherever used in this Agreement, the 
terms "region of Asia and the Far East" and "region" shall comprise the territories of Asia 
and the Far East included in the Terms of Reference of the United Nations Economic 




To fulfil its purpose, the Bank shall have the following functions: 
(i) to promote investment in the region of public and private capital for 
development purposes; 
(ii) to utilize the resources at its disposal for financing development of the 
developing member countries in the region, giving priority to those regional, sub-
regional as well as national projects and programmes which will contribute most 
effectively to the harmonious economic growth of the region as a whole, and 
having special regard to the needs of the smaller or less developed member 
countries in the region; 
(iii) to meet requests from members in the region to assist them in the co-ordination 
of their development policies and plans with a view to achieving better utilization 
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of their resources, making their economies more complementary, and promoting 
the orderly expansion of their foreign trade, in particular, intra-regional trade; 
(iv) to provide technical assistance for the preparation, financing and execution of 
development projects and programmes, including the formulation of specific 
project proposals; 
(v) to co-operate, in such a manner as the Bank may deem appropriate, within the 
terms of this Agreement, with the United Nations, its organs and subsidiary 
bodies including, in particular, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East, and with public international organizations and other international 
institutions, as well as national entities whether public or private, which are 
concerned with the investment of development funds in the region, and to 
interest such institutions and entities in new opportunities for investment and 
assistance; and 
(vi) to undertake such other activities and provide such other services as may 




1. Membership in the Bank shall be open to: (i) members and associate members of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; and (ii) other regional 
countries and non-regional developed countries which are members of the United Nations 
or of any of its specialized agencies. 
2. Countries eligible for membership under paragraph 1 of this Article which do not 
become members in accordance with Article 64 of this Agreement may be admitted, under 
such terms and conditions as the Bank may determine, to membership in the Bank upon the 
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affirmative vote of two-thirds of the total number of Governors, representing not less than 
three-fourths of the total voting power of the members. 
3. In the case of associate members of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East which are not responsible for the conduct of their international 
relations, application for membership in the Bank shall be presented by the member of the 
Bank responsible for the international relations of the applicant and accompanied by an 
undertaking by such member that, until the applicant itself assumes such responsibility, the 
member shall be responsible for all obligations that may be incurred by the applicant by 
reason of admission to membership in the Bank and enjoyment of the benefits of such 
membership.  "Country" as used in this Agreement shall include a territory which is an 




Appendix E: Bangkok Declaration, 8 August 1967268
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/ Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand: 
 
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of 
South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of 
regional solidarity and cooperation; 
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby 
contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region; 
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, 
freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good 
understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries of 
the region already bound together by ties of history and culture; 
CONSIDERING that the countries of SouthEast (sic) Asia share a primary responsibility for 
strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peacefull 
(sic) and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their 
stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to 
preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their 
peoples; 
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed 
concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or 
                                                            
268 Bangkok Declaration, 8 August 1967, reproduced in Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
"Bangkok Declaration (1967)," 8 August 1967, <http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm>, August 2012. 
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indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or 
prejudice the orderly processes of their national development; 
DO HEREBY DECLARE: 
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the countries of 
South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
SECOND, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be: 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to 
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East 
Asian Nations; 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the 
rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the 
principles of the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common 
interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative 
fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in 
the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and 
industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of 
international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and 
communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 
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7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional 
organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even 
closer cooperation among themselves. 
THIRD, that to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be 
established: 
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.  Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened 
as required. 
(b) A Standing committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host 
country or his representative and having as its members the accredited 
Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work of the 
Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers. 
(c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on 
specific subjects. 
(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the 
Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings 
of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other committees as may 
hereafter be established. 
FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian 
Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes. 
FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to 
bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and 
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